Sunday, October 3, 2021

Power Regulation: In the dark

 


October 3, 2021 | 6:14 pm

Introspective By Romeo L. Bernardo

 

Since we passed EPIRA 20 years ago, the energy sector has come a long way. It has not been a smooth journey and, understandably, mistakes have been made. We have, however, made much progress in ensuring that our country has the energy needed to power its economy, support investment, and generate jobs, and thereby improve outcomes for our people. To continue to build a sustainable and responsive energy system we must understand the role of our energy policymakers and regulators and challenges they face.

Let me start with some disclosures. I was an Undersecretary of Finance during the last two years of the Cory Aquino and the first four years of the Ramos administrations, and was involved in addressing the 1990/92 power crisis. I am currently an independent director in a diversified publicly listed holding company with major investments in power generation (both fossil fuels and renewables) and distribution.


The nation’s long term structural response to prevent a repeat of the massively costly 1990/92 crisis was the passage of the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA; 2001), after seven years of intensive study and debate involving all stakeholders. As envisioned, private sector players are expected to deliver electricity under a competitive playing field. A critical element of EPIRA was to “break up” the business — separating those selling energy from those buying it. This transformed the energy sector into a real marketplace, which is the key to lowering energy prices while ensuring quality supply. The government’s role is to ensure market players abide by market rules to produce the competitive outcome.

Over the past two decades, much has changed. The once stable power sector has been disrupted by a number of forces, resulting in higher levels of uncertainty for market participants and stakeholders.

The market liberalization set in motion by EPIRA is alone a challenge, but accelerating technology curves, and elevated expectations around environmental sustainability have increased the complexity of our energy system. As the system evolves, our regulators also need to evolve to maintain their ability to manage the system.

As we approach elections and tackle near-term challenges such as thinness in energy supply, we must reflect on our experiences and craft a long-term vision for the industry. This includes a future vision for our energy sector public institutions. I would like to put forward a few reflections for your consideration.

First, our policy-makers and regulators must ensure a focus on the long-term, especially when the short-term political stakes are high. In the slow-moving energy industry, decisions can be made fast but the consequences of those decisions — whether positive or negative — will not emerge for years. This environment can be challenging for public leaders whose performance is measured in real-time by the Twitterati. It is often easier to address the short-term political pressures at the expense of the long-term health of the system.

Case in point are the decisions to impose price caps on the wholesale market twice over. Price controls are an effective way to reduce prices in the short term and to respond to a burst of public criticism, but in the context of a free market, where pricing signals encourage or discourage new investment, they can distort the market and unintentionally result in supply gaps in peaking capacity.

Fortunately, it is not too late to fix this. The price caps can be withdrawn and the market can be allowed to work as designed.

It must also be said that our regulators have demonstrated the necessary foresight and restraint needed to manage such a complex industry. The repeated resistance to the idea of retroactive changes to distribution rates has provided market participants with confidence that the sanctity of commitments will be protected and is paramount in an environment where large-scale, long-term capital investments are necessary. These decisions that put the long-term interests of the country and its energy stakeholders ahead of the popular (or perhaps more aptly, populists) interests of today are the foundations for a successful long-term energy system.

To address the underlying tension, however, we must hold our energy institutions to a higher standard and insulate them from political pressure, much as we have with the Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). The BSP has evolved over time to be recognized both here and globally for excellence of its independent and non-politicized stewardship of the monetary system and supervision of banks and other financial institutions for price stability and development.

Electricity is arguably as critical to the day-to-day health of our country as banking. Perhaps there are lessons for the energy sector to draw from our institution-building experience in the financial sector.

Secondly, we must ensure we match the capabilities and strategies of our public institutions to meet the challenges of the job at hand, not use blunt, heavy-handed regulation as a means of avoiding the complexity of the job.


Today, the electricity value chain includes varying levels of industry structure and market power. The power generation sector is competitive and includes a diversity of market mechanisms that allow the buying and selling of electricity to occur. The transmission line sector, on the other hand, is a single nationwide monopoly that is tasked with connecting our power plants to our distribution networks and contracting power reserves. The low voltage distribution sector is composed of jurisdictional monopolies that transmit power to our homes and businesses.

The diversity of market participation, market design, and market power across the value chain makes the job of regulation and management a difficult one. It requires a high level of sophistication in organizational design, capability, and culture.

Fundamentally, the approach to regulating natural monopolies should be vastly different from the approach to a competitive market. The regulator should take a hands-on approach to regulating the natural monopolies’ market power, while taking a more hands off approach, a lighter touch, in overseeing the competitive sector, allowing the market to work and focusing instead on long term guidance and market optimization that increases competition and market responsiveness.

Since the onset of EPIRA, unfortunately, our regulators have done the reverse, taking what seems to be a hands-off approach to the least competitive segment of the value chain, the transmission line segment, and an overly hands-on approach to the most competitive segment of the value chain, the generation segment.

This is evidenced in the organizational structure of the regulator, whereby they have evolved to create two teams called the Investigation and Enforcement Division to police the generation and distribution segments, but have not established one for the transmission line segment. This may partially explain why numerous documented cases of non-compliance to franchise and other regulations by the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP) have yet to be enforced.

On the unregulated end of the spectrum, gencos are required to obtain 326 signatures to build a new power plant. Once built, they have to undergo a burdensome process of Certificate of Compliance renewal every five years, lest they cannot continue the operations of their power plant. This is in stark contrast to the 25-year franchise renewal process of monopolies such as NGCP. This approach of trying to regulate what is designed to not be regulated has had the unintended consequence of increasing the level of uncertainty in the operating environment. This in turn is dampening investor confidence and increasing the costs of compliance.

As I look ahead into the future of the energy industry in the Philippines, my hope is that we as a country are able to come together to develop the foresight, the political will, and the institutional capability necessary to make the challenging tradeoffs involved in navigating the complex issues facing the energy industry.

As stewards of the future, we owe it to the next generation to take the long view and to have the clarity of vision and the courage to take the necessary, even if  unpopular, actions along the way.

 


Romeo L. Bernardo was finance undersecretary during the Cory Aquino and Fidel Ramos administrations.

romeo.lopez.bernardo@gmail.com

 

Friday, October 1, 2021

Impact of the Mandanas Ruling













 

APPC Webinar 1 on Resetting Capitalism- Moderator Opening Remarks

 

Moderator Opening Remarks

 



Thank you for the kind introduction.  I was going to write a review on the subject but was spared the effort by my former GlobalSource Partners co-author Maggie Debuque Gonzales. Her thoughtful and comprehensive report titled “Re-thinking shareholder capitalism” was shared with me, and I encourage all to read.



Let me summarize the key points in her paper peppered

w my own musings:



1) there has been recent serious rethinking both in academia and business circles of the Friedman Principle— “the only responsibility of business is to increase profit”.   Initially occasioned by the Global Financial Crisis, and now with the harsh impact of COVID, which revealed some of the weaknesses of the existing capitalist system.  In the business sector, the debate focussed on which market model would deliver long lasting and widespread prosperity— stakeholder capitalism or shareholder capitalism.



2) landmark events that skewed  the discussion towards

 the latter are:


- the August 2019 US Business Roundtable signed by over 180 CEO’s of major corporations released a “statement on the purpose of a corporation” that declared “a fundamental commitment to all stakeholders” and listed specific commitments to customers, employees, suppliers and relevant communities, in addition to long term value for corporate shareholders “. 



- here in the Philippine 20 business organizations signed last November 2020 “ A Covenant for Shared Prosperity” where the country’s business leaders vowed to raise the welfare of all local stakeholders.


- these same organizations and conglomerates,  have also walked the talk in addressing pain points brought about by the pandemic, way way beyond their commercial interests.  These initiatives welcomed by and working hand in hand w govt include  in :  testing facilities ( construction of new laboratories), quarantine facilities, hospital facilities, vaccination procurement, administration and communications.  


These were all done in the Phl Bayanihan spirit of volunteerism,  not because of dictat, but a recognition that corporations do have social responsibilities emanating from their dominant role and command over resources, apart  from individual shareholders initiatives.



3)  The pandemic and talk of a a new normal and a reset have raised the profile of the issue.   Practical question of  how do we translate high level principles to actionable items for  boards and managements ( esp of major publicly listed corporations.)

   

a) how relevant are the limiting conditions to Friedman in a developing country / Phl contexts? 



Hart and Zingales wrote: “Friedman is right only if the profit making and damage generating activities of companies are separable or if governmentperfectly internalizes externalities through laws and regulations” or in case the government does not, if the shareholder population  perfectly internalizes externalities and spend the appropriate amount for mitigation or correction.

 

 

These assumptions are:


- perfect market (no market failure ) assumptions chief among which are 
           

             - no market power (implying no rule making power for firms) 
            - no externalities (absence of markets ) and whether they may or                                    

 

                may not be internalized by shareholder.

 

 


The answer is clearly affirmative. But these assumptions are heroic and generally hold true only for small firms. Thus, they conclude maximization of shareholder welfare should now be Pareto efficient for large firms while the Friedman rule of maximizing shareholder value hold only for

Small firms.

.  
 

b) which brings us to the next question:  how do we  operationalize stakeholder welfare optimization, clearly the relevant situation in a country like the Phl w high concentration of large companies?



- multiple masters and objectives means no guidance to the Board.  (Issue of primacy of  fiduciary responsibility to shareholders still a live one. To give weight to interests of other stakeholders, often amorphously , on the premise of social responsibility is de facto is

“taxation without representation” on the residual owners, the shareholders..  

 


- conflicts not just  across various stakeholder interests, but also how much weight to attach to conflicting social goods?   To cite a very live debate for the Phl, the issue of the energy trilemma— energy security, affordability/equity vs environment for a country which needs fossil fuel driven base load plants to address poverty— and which only contributes 0.3 pc to global carbon and  in relative terms much less per capita.



-“market-oriented solutions” include:


*ESG ratings— now an emerging industry w dozens of players , but with differing methodologies and emphasis, but in all cases overweighting E - carbon reduction vs S- social impact.  

 


*other mechanisms like explicit vote in Board of Directors or all shareholders  on policy as suggested by Hart and Zingales.

 

I would be remiss if I do not call out more general questions posed by our organizers on the Great Reset.  Namely:

 

• How must we reset our ways of life and rebuild toward a better normal?

• How can we build new foundations for the world’s economic and social systems?

• How can we steer the market towards fairer outcomes?

• How can we ensure that investments advance shared goals, such as equality and sustainability?

  

 


To address these questions, we are most honored to have as our  featuredspeaker, highly acclaimed thinker on the subject, Prof. Luigi Zingales.




Professor Luigi Zingales is Robert C. McCormack Distinguished Service Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance and faculty director of the Stigler Center at Chicago Booth. Zingales' research interests span from corporate governance to financial development, from political economy to the economic effects of culture. He co- developed the Financial Trust Index, designed to monitor the level of trust that Americans have toward their financial system. In addition to his position at Chicago Booth, Zingales is currently a faculty research fellow for the National Bureau of Economic Research, a research fellow for the Center for Economic Policy Research, and a fellow of the European Governance Institute. Zingales also serves on the board of ProMarket and is the co-host of the podcast Capitalisn't.

 

 

Pls help me welcome Prof Zingales with a warm virtual applause.

 

 

At the end of his talk.

 

 

To provide reactions to his talk, we are honored to have two deep thinkers on the subject with familiarity  with the Phl and other EMC’s.  One a practitioner like me, and another an Professor .  

 

 

The first is :

 

 

MR. ANTON PERIQUET

 

Mr. Anton Periquet is Chairman and Managing Director of the Campden Hill Group, an investment holding company that owns interests in publicly listed and private equities. He was until recently chairman of BPI Asset Management and Trust Corporation, the wealth management arm of the Bank of the Philippine Islands, and is currently a director in various publicly listed companies, including Ayala Corporation, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, DMCI Holdings, the Max’s Group, Philippine Seven Corporation, Universal Robina Corporation, and Semirara Mining and Power Corporation.   He is an experienced investor and equities analyst and co-founded Deutsche Regis Partners, Inc.

 

Pls help me welcome him. 

 

At the end of his talk. Our next speaker is :

 

DR. BENITO L. TEEHANKEE

Jose E. Cuisia Professor of Business Ethics Management and Organization Department Ramon V. del Rosario College of Business De La Salle University

Dr. Benito L. Teehankee is the Jose E. Cuisia Professor of Business Ethics at the Management and Organization Department of the Ramon V. del Rosario College of Business, De La Salle University. He is Head of the Business for Human Development Network (BHDN). His research focuses on corporate governance, leadership ethics and institutional change. He conducts governance and management development seminars for various corporations. He serves on the boards of the Philippine Academy of Management (PAoM), Shareholders Association of the Philippines (SharePHIL), and the International Humanistic Management Association (IHMA). He has been awarded as Best Business Columnist for his writing in Managing for Society in the Manila Times by the Catholic Mass Media Awards (CMMA) and Outstanding Educator in Corporate Governance by the Financial Executives of the Philippines (FINEX).

 

Take it away, Prof Ben! 

 

—- 

Now for the open forum.  Pls type out your questions in the chat room or in FB, and they will be relayed to me.

 

Let me start the ball rolling while we wait for questions from the floor by asking the first question.