Business World
My colleague, Ms. Margarita D. Gonzales, and I just gave an update on the Philippine fiscal picture in light of recent announcement by the Department of Finance of the end-October numbers to fund managers and holders of Philippine RoPs, who are subscribers to Global Source, a network of independent analysts. This is what I told them:
- The headline clearly is we have already breached government's full- year deficit ceiling (P250 B, 3.2% of GDP) with the year-to-date deficit already at P266.1 billion.
' The national deficit continued to widen as revenues weakened - down 7.6% yoy in October (down 4.8% Jan.-Oct.), still due to an economic slowdown and, more so, tax-reducing measures (e.g., lowered corporate income tax, minimum wage exemptions, reversion to franchise taxes in lieu of other taxes for electricity transmission).
' BIR collections declined again in October (down 5.1% yoy Jan.- Oct.) while BOC collections fell considerably during the month (down 15.7% yoy Jan-Oct ).
- The finance secretary's official comment has been that the department will continue to work harder and endeavor to be more effective in implementing our tax administration measures, hoping that Congress will also support them in their bid for revenue enhancement measures that can bring in sustainable sources of revenues for the government.
' Finance department now expects a P280 B deficit (3.6% of GDP) factoring in sale of SMC shares, but without that , about P300 B (3.8% of GDP)
- Here at GlobalSource Philippines, we are sticking to our assessment made in our last quarterly outlook report. The breach of the official target is in line with our expectations as we look to a number closer to 4% of GDP in 2009 (about P310 B).
- Unfortunately, there is little hope now for narrowing this year' s fiscal gap:
' One, because of the recent typhoons/floods, collections can be expected to weaken further (with calamity losses tax-deductible and possibly some leniency for humanitarian reasons) while there is now even greater pressure for the government to continue spending (for reconstruction and rehabilitation).
' Two, the touted improvement in administrative measures are not expected to add that much to the equation.
' Three, the SMC sale, expected to yield P50 billion or almost one percent of GDP, which is what the government is banking on, involves legal hurdles over ownership. This is a case that has been pending for years, and unlikely to be decided before yearend.
' Also, prospects are weak for other planned privatizations judged by the recent bid failure of a Metro Manila property (FTI complex in Taguig) and the loud protestations by politicians over alleged possible midnight asset sales by an outgoing administration (including protests over the sale of a supposedly hicstorical property in Fujima, Japan).
' Finally, we already see a narrowing (if not closed) window for passage of tax reforms (especially new measures) over the next few months given the May 2010 elections. In fact, it would be best if nothing comes out of this Congress. Why? Given we are already in election season, the risk is that what comes out will be the exact opposite of what is needed as what happened with the Comprehensive Tax Reform package in 1995.
y A good example of a bad measure is recently proposed legislation by an influential congressman, which seems to have the support of the finance secretary, to encourage voluntary advance tax payments to generate P100 billion for flooding reconstruction by offering a discount to the taxpayers. This kind of revenue anticipation, apart from causing confusion in government finance statistics time series data, can only cost government more than if it simply borrowed from a very liquid debt market. Clearly, for taxpayers to find this attractive, the discount government needs to give will have to be at least equal to taxpayers' cost of borrowing, which is much higher than government's own cost of borrowing.
- Now, let us let us look at the prospects for 2010:
' We note that government is sticking to its existing deficit target (P233.4 B, 2.8% of GDP).
' We however are not so optimistic that this is achievable (will likely still breach 3% of GDP given the circumstances, e.g., still tepid growth, lack of needed new tax measures).
' Notably, the tax effort ratio could shrink to pre-2006 levels this year, i.e., the range just prior to the introduction of the expanded VAT, and significant improvement will definitely require that new fiscal reform measures be implemented.
- But, as we had stated in our latest quarterly report, we aren't that worried about the impact on financial markets for a few reasons:
' The continued high level of remittances (up 8.6% in Sep, up 4.2% Jan-Sep, defying previous expectations of a decline) as a robust current account allows a healthy amount of dollar borrowing (enough to calm the peso bond market, and allowing even a pre- funding of next year's requirements) while keeping liquidity conditions loose.
' A deficit of the size currently expected has already been factored in by the markets for 2009 with the consensus that such is manageable.
' Though the deficit will likely not narrow by much next year, it would still be an improvement over this year's fiscal gap ;and we have greater hopes that reform measures can be successfully pushed with the entry of a new and more popular administration.
- In short, while emerging fiscal concerns are certainly daunting with the poor state of government finances and embedded revenue and spending millstone, the new political environment gives us a promising window to animate the country/economy and improve growth potentials over the next six years helping the new government to achieve hoped-for medium-term fiscal consolidation (i.e., reining in future deficits and bringing the debt ratio back on a downward trajectory).
Mr. Romeo Bernardo is Global Source Philippine advisor and board member of The Institute for Development and Econometric Analysis, Inc. He was formerly undersecretary of Finance during the Aquino and Ramos administrations.
Monday, November 23, 2009
Friday, November 13, 2009
Crude solution
Business World
Introspective
Acouple of weeks ago, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued an executive order that turned back oil prices in Luzon, which has been placed under a state of calamity, to where they were on October 15 as relief to typhoon victims. This added to an already long list of price controls temporarily placed in typhoon-stricken areas on items ranging from rice to sardines to funeral services.
The cap on fuel prices unleashed the sharpest response from the business sector, largely because of the history behind oil price controls. The industry was deregulated only in the late 1990s, and memories of shortages such a policy produced remained fresh in people's minds, not to mention the enormous subsidy cost of trying to stabilize prices.
Local business groups and foreign chambers of commerce have railed against the imposed measure. Their arguments were hard to refute - price controls would only distort supply, spur shortages, create a black market (and black market prices), lead to profit losses for oil firms, and discourage investment. Those who showed some support for the wielding of state powers highlighted the need for it to be used sparingly and within a very limited time.
Even the central bank has spoken up on the issue. A deputy governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) warned the public on the dangers of price controls, which he said created market distortions and affected availability of supply in the long run. A Palace economic adviser has also weighed in on the issue, arguing how price caps on petroleum products disproportionately benefited the well-to-do and resulted in revenue losses of as much as P4.5 billion (from VAT and income taxes), while opining how it was much sounder for the government to just target help to typhoon victims (e.g., through diesel discounts, discounted fuel access cards for lower-to-middle- income families, and income transfers to the poor).
But the President has kept distance from the debates, leaving it to a task force led by the energy and justice departments to decide whether or not price controls should be lifted. The task force has been meeting with the private sector but says it will need to wait for the verdict of the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) on how soon the emergency situation can be expected to end. With its hands-off policy, the Palace will also likely let the courts defuse tension, as one of the Big Three (Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp.) has questioned the legality of EO 839 and asked for its lifting.
The capping of oil prices may be perceived as merely a well- intentioned but wrong-headed policy designed to ease the plight of calamity victims. However, the lack of a clear effort toward consensus-building hints at a less straightforward agenda, not the first time that the country's leader would play to the gallery (e.g., less than full recovery of power costs until 2004, brief suspension of automatic indexation of water tariffs, and freezing of toll fees).
Apart from failure to confer with industry players, only a few Cabinet officials had apparently been closely consulted in crafting the measure, with the puzzling omission of the secretaries of energy, finance and economic planning and the central bank governor.
At the moment, there is a battle of wills between oil companies and government. Oil companies threaten shortages and shutdowns, while government officials and administration lawmakers warn of the full force of the law. One Palace insider describes the mood in the corridors of power as pregnant with petulance.
The danger is, the longer this is allowed to drag, the messier it becomes for the local fuel market, the harder to unwind, and the worse for the economy in general. Already, arbitrage and shortages are being reported in certain areas in Luzon where oil firms allege they have to sell at a loss, while complaints have been made about escalating prices elsewhere in the country.
The sector to watch out for is LPG (also used for household cooking), a sensitive market that will likely be the first to take a hit because of the weak financial muscle and low profit buffers of independent players who together hold more than a fifth of market share. LPG retailers have threatened to stop sales if price caps continue until December.
Inflation also becomes harder for monetary authorities to manage if the present situation continues, explaining BSP's timely take on the issue. As one central bank official cryptically confided to friends, maybe [the] measure is temporary but caution ensures it will not be permanent. Local pump prices have kept relatively steady despite the rise in world prices purportedly as a result of price wars, but will later have to follow global trends. Keeping rates below market level for a long time will only lead to price surges when ceilings are removed.
For the longer term, the present episode could mean a dilution of the oil deregulation law which the Ramos government took pains to establish. Already, Congress is looking for ways to amend the law and widen the powers of the state to correct abuses especially during special circumstances (e.g., by raising the transparency of price-setting, spurring competition by building up smaller players, or bringing back some form of price regulation).
The quickest break to the impasse would be if both government and oil players agree on a compromise - a discount for typhoon victims perhaps, as what seems to be the emerging consensus, or limiting the measure to highly distressed areas with an agreement to gradually phase in price increases elsewhere in Luzon. The NDCC could also decide that a state of calamity no longer holds, making any court case against the freezing of oil prices academic. Otherwise, oil firms could simply wait for the court system to grant a restraining order on the measure which should not be too long though the relief will be temporary.
The above scenarios still offer the administration a graceful exit from the self-inflicted dilemma.
Government trumpeters have repeatedly assured that price measures will generally be geographically, temporally, and legally bound, but the truth is how long caps on oil prices in particular can last depends entirely on the President. In the meantime, inventories have been dropping as oil importers begin to cancel scheduled purchases - from the usual three weeks to less than two, according to the energy secretary - creating a possible backdrop, some speculate, for a state-led fuel allocation plan. Listening to industry experts, one gets the feel that the longest major players can survive this game is two months and the smaller players maybe just one. Government could of course try to maximize brownie points and stretch oil firms to their limits before it finally folds its cards, but this would be at a great cost ultimately.
(This column is based on a GlobalSource report written for international fund managers entitled Crude Solution, co-authored by Margarita D. Gonzales.)
Romeo Bernardo is board member of The Institute for Development and Econometric Analysis and is managing director of Lazaro, Bernardo, Tiu and Associates, Inc.
Introspective
Acouple of weeks ago, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued an executive order that turned back oil prices in Luzon, which has been placed under a state of calamity, to where they were on October 15 as relief to typhoon victims. This added to an already long list of price controls temporarily placed in typhoon-stricken areas on items ranging from rice to sardines to funeral services.
The cap on fuel prices unleashed the sharpest response from the business sector, largely because of the history behind oil price controls. The industry was deregulated only in the late 1990s, and memories of shortages such a policy produced remained fresh in people's minds, not to mention the enormous subsidy cost of trying to stabilize prices.
Local business groups and foreign chambers of commerce have railed against the imposed measure. Their arguments were hard to refute - price controls would only distort supply, spur shortages, create a black market (and black market prices), lead to profit losses for oil firms, and discourage investment. Those who showed some support for the wielding of state powers highlighted the need for it to be used sparingly and within a very limited time.
Even the central bank has spoken up on the issue. A deputy governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) warned the public on the dangers of price controls, which he said created market distortions and affected availability of supply in the long run. A Palace economic adviser has also weighed in on the issue, arguing how price caps on petroleum products disproportionately benefited the well-to-do and resulted in revenue losses of as much as P4.5 billion (from VAT and income taxes), while opining how it was much sounder for the government to just target help to typhoon victims (e.g., through diesel discounts, discounted fuel access cards for lower-to-middle- income families, and income transfers to the poor).
But the President has kept distance from the debates, leaving it to a task force led by the energy and justice departments to decide whether or not price controls should be lifted. The task force has been meeting with the private sector but says it will need to wait for the verdict of the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) on how soon the emergency situation can be expected to end. With its hands-off policy, the Palace will also likely let the courts defuse tension, as one of the Big Three (Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp.) has questioned the legality of EO 839 and asked for its lifting.
The capping of oil prices may be perceived as merely a well- intentioned but wrong-headed policy designed to ease the plight of calamity victims. However, the lack of a clear effort toward consensus-building hints at a less straightforward agenda, not the first time that the country's leader would play to the gallery (e.g., less than full recovery of power costs until 2004, brief suspension of automatic indexation of water tariffs, and freezing of toll fees).
Apart from failure to confer with industry players, only a few Cabinet officials had apparently been closely consulted in crafting the measure, with the puzzling omission of the secretaries of energy, finance and economic planning and the central bank governor.
At the moment, there is a battle of wills between oil companies and government. Oil companies threaten shortages and shutdowns, while government officials and administration lawmakers warn of the full force of the law. One Palace insider describes the mood in the corridors of power as pregnant with petulance.
The danger is, the longer this is allowed to drag, the messier it becomes for the local fuel market, the harder to unwind, and the worse for the economy in general. Already, arbitrage and shortages are being reported in certain areas in Luzon where oil firms allege they have to sell at a loss, while complaints have been made about escalating prices elsewhere in the country.
The sector to watch out for is LPG (also used for household cooking), a sensitive market that will likely be the first to take a hit because of the weak financial muscle and low profit buffers of independent players who together hold more than a fifth of market share. LPG retailers have threatened to stop sales if price caps continue until December.
Inflation also becomes harder for monetary authorities to manage if the present situation continues, explaining BSP's timely take on the issue. As one central bank official cryptically confided to friends, maybe [the] measure is temporary but caution ensures it will not be permanent. Local pump prices have kept relatively steady despite the rise in world prices purportedly as a result of price wars, but will later have to follow global trends. Keeping rates below market level for a long time will only lead to price surges when ceilings are removed.
For the longer term, the present episode could mean a dilution of the oil deregulation law which the Ramos government took pains to establish. Already, Congress is looking for ways to amend the law and widen the powers of the state to correct abuses especially during special circumstances (e.g., by raising the transparency of price-setting, spurring competition by building up smaller players, or bringing back some form of price regulation).
The quickest break to the impasse would be if both government and oil players agree on a compromise - a discount for typhoon victims perhaps, as what seems to be the emerging consensus, or limiting the measure to highly distressed areas with an agreement to gradually phase in price increases elsewhere in Luzon. The NDCC could also decide that a state of calamity no longer holds, making any court case against the freezing of oil prices academic. Otherwise, oil firms could simply wait for the court system to grant a restraining order on the measure which should not be too long though the relief will be temporary.
The above scenarios still offer the administration a graceful exit from the self-inflicted dilemma.
Government trumpeters have repeatedly assured that price measures will generally be geographically, temporally, and legally bound, but the truth is how long caps on oil prices in particular can last depends entirely on the President. In the meantime, inventories have been dropping as oil importers begin to cancel scheduled purchases - from the usual three weeks to less than two, according to the energy secretary - creating a possible backdrop, some speculate, for a state-led fuel allocation plan. Listening to industry experts, one gets the feel that the longest major players can survive this game is two months and the smaller players maybe just one. Government could of course try to maximize brownie points and stretch oil firms to their limits before it finally folds its cards, but this would be at a great cost ultimately.
(This column is based on a GlobalSource report written for international fund managers entitled Crude Solution, co-authored by Margarita D. Gonzales.)
Romeo Bernardo is board member of The Institute for Development and Econometric Analysis and is managing director of Lazaro, Bernardo, Tiu and Associates, Inc.
Monday, November 2, 2009
Oil price controls
Business World
Introspective
The administration recently issued the controversial and poorly studied Executive Order 839 imposing price controls on oil. Economists and industry analysts have observed that, hand in hand with rampant oil smuggling, which an IMF paper euphemistically referred to as underdeclaration of imports due to election-related lenience in 2007, this will encourage full bloom of black-marketing and corruption with the coming 2010 vote.
To provide general background on the issue, the author thought it useful to share the section on Oil Deregulation of a study on the Political Economy of Reform During the Ramos Administration done by Christine Tang and him for the World Bank Growth Commission in 2008. The full report which also covers Water Privatization and Telecom De-Monopolization can be accessed via the following link http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp039web.pdf.
If there is proof of political will on the part of the Ramos presidency or of any other Philippine presidency, let this new oil deregulation law be the proof of that.... - Statement of Fidel V. Ramos. Enactment into law of R.A. 8479, Feb.10, 1998.
The deregulation of the downstream oil industry involved the highly politicized issue of liberalizing oil pricing. Three important considerations were (i) a long history, dating back to the 1970s, of civil disturbance related to oil price adjustments; (ii) the cost was going to be spread out across a wider segment of the population, including well organized, low-income groups such as transport groups that in the past partly paralyzed Metro Manila through transport strikes; and (iii) legislation was required to enact liberalization. Thus, from the start, the Ramos government focused on managing potentially broad opposition to the reform.
Efforts to deregulate the industry started as early as 1993. The Ramos administration launched a nationwide public information campaign to educate people about the workings of the oil market and allay fears of spiraling prices after deregulation. Public acceptance of (or at least reduced resistance to) the proposal was deemed important to get the congressional nod for proposed legislation to deregulate the industry. The Ramos government also committed the reform measure under the country's program with the IMF to help set a timeframe for passing legislation.
Although government officials related that they encountered very little resistance during the nationwide roadshow, what is interesting about this reform experience were the actions of the veto players - the legislature and the judiciary.
As the initial spadework on the proposed bill led up to the May 1995 congressional and local elections, work had to be put on hold as the likelihood of getting congressional approval became slim. While certain nationalist members of the legislature continued to strongly oppose the proposal when Congress resumed in July 1995, the LEDAC mechanism proved invaluable in speeding up congressional approval of the bill. An oil deregulation law was enacted and was in force for roughly 18 months starting in April 1996. During that period, a fully deregulated regime, with the oil companies free to adjust oil prices, had been gradually phased in. In November 1997, in response to a petition by a group of congressmen who had voted against the bill, the Supreme Court declared the law unconstitutional.
At the time, the Philippines was already four months into the Asian crisis. With the peso having lost a quarter of its value, which pushed up domestic oil prices, the Ramos administration was under renewed pressure to reregulate the industry. Nevertheless, the president persisted in pursuing the reform both by trying to get the Supreme Court to reverse its ruling and by asking Congress to pass a new law without the constitutional infirmity cited by the court. President Ramos succeeded in the latter, signing into law the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Law in February 1998.
The benefits of oil deregulation became evident during the most recent run-up in world oil prices. The full pass-through of world oil price increases to domestic oil prices helped to shield the fiscal sector from the burden of providing oil subsidies at a time when government finances were most fragile. Other benefits have included (i) increased competition in the industry with the entry of new players; (ii) less politicization of oil pricing; (iii) proper market response to high oil prices, including conservation and the search for substitutes like biofuels; and (iv) clean and good restrooms at service stations all over the country as a by-product of introducing competition in the industry, helping support tourism.
Mr. Romeo Bernardo is Global Source Philippine advisor and board member of The Institute for Development and Econometric Analysis, Inc. He was formerly undersecretary of finance during the Aquino and Ramos administrations.
Introspective
The administration recently issued the controversial and poorly studied Executive Order 839 imposing price controls on oil. Economists and industry analysts have observed that, hand in hand with rampant oil smuggling, which an IMF paper euphemistically referred to as underdeclaration of imports due to election-related lenience in 2007, this will encourage full bloom of black-marketing and corruption with the coming 2010 vote.
To provide general background on the issue, the author thought it useful to share the section on Oil Deregulation of a study on the Political Economy of Reform During the Ramos Administration done by Christine Tang and him for the World Bank Growth Commission in 2008. The full report which also covers Water Privatization and Telecom De-Monopolization can be accessed via the following link http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp039web.pdf.
If there is proof of political will on the part of the Ramos presidency or of any other Philippine presidency, let this new oil deregulation law be the proof of that.... - Statement of Fidel V. Ramos. Enactment into law of R.A. 8479, Feb.10, 1998.
The deregulation of the downstream oil industry involved the highly politicized issue of liberalizing oil pricing. Three important considerations were (i) a long history, dating back to the 1970s, of civil disturbance related to oil price adjustments; (ii) the cost was going to be spread out across a wider segment of the population, including well organized, low-income groups such as transport groups that in the past partly paralyzed Metro Manila through transport strikes; and (iii) legislation was required to enact liberalization. Thus, from the start, the Ramos government focused on managing potentially broad opposition to the reform.
Efforts to deregulate the industry started as early as 1993. The Ramos administration launched a nationwide public information campaign to educate people about the workings of the oil market and allay fears of spiraling prices after deregulation. Public acceptance of (or at least reduced resistance to) the proposal was deemed important to get the congressional nod for proposed legislation to deregulate the industry. The Ramos government also committed the reform measure under the country's program with the IMF to help set a timeframe for passing legislation.
Although government officials related that they encountered very little resistance during the nationwide roadshow, what is interesting about this reform experience were the actions of the veto players - the legislature and the judiciary.
As the initial spadework on the proposed bill led up to the May 1995 congressional and local elections, work had to be put on hold as the likelihood of getting congressional approval became slim. While certain nationalist members of the legislature continued to strongly oppose the proposal when Congress resumed in July 1995, the LEDAC mechanism proved invaluable in speeding up congressional approval of the bill. An oil deregulation law was enacted and was in force for roughly 18 months starting in April 1996. During that period, a fully deregulated regime, with the oil companies free to adjust oil prices, had been gradually phased in. In November 1997, in response to a petition by a group of congressmen who had voted against the bill, the Supreme Court declared the law unconstitutional.
At the time, the Philippines was already four months into the Asian crisis. With the peso having lost a quarter of its value, which pushed up domestic oil prices, the Ramos administration was under renewed pressure to reregulate the industry. Nevertheless, the president persisted in pursuing the reform both by trying to get the Supreme Court to reverse its ruling and by asking Congress to pass a new law without the constitutional infirmity cited by the court. President Ramos succeeded in the latter, signing into law the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Law in February 1998.
The benefits of oil deregulation became evident during the most recent run-up in world oil prices. The full pass-through of world oil price increases to domestic oil prices helped to shield the fiscal sector from the burden of providing oil subsidies at a time when government finances were most fragile. Other benefits have included (i) increased competition in the industry with the entry of new players; (ii) less politicization of oil pricing; (iii) proper market response to high oil prices, including conservation and the search for substitutes like biofuels; and (iv) clean and good restrooms at service stations all over the country as a by-product of introducing competition in the industry, helping support tourism.
Mr. Romeo Bernardo is Global Source Philippine advisor and board member of The Institute for Development and Econometric Analysis, Inc. He was formerly undersecretary of finance during the Aquino and Ramos administrations.
Monday, October 5, 2009
Fiscal imperative for next administration
Business World
Introspective
As one would expect, there have been a spate of nonpartisan exercises on a road map for the country post 2010 among institutions that have an interest in the long-term development of the country. I have been a participant/resource person in a number of them - including, the ADB, the Makati Business Club and the Ramos Peace and Development Foundation; the last one involving six presidentiables who were invited to present their platforms.
Giving the welcome remarks in the Ramos forum, I noted that while we keenly awaited the expositions of the aspirants, many of us are likely to believe that It is useless to try to hold people to anything they say when they are madly in love, drunk - or running for public office.
This was recently validated by good friend, economist guru Philip Medalla. He said that each time he and his collaborators from the UP School of Economics presented their road map with heavy emphasis on how to raise revenues to finance neglected public spending programs, none would publicly embrace the well-thought-out tax measures they propose, like increase in the VAT rate and oil taxes. The solution of the presidential hopefuls then (which do not include the current two front-runners) almost uniformly was, I will improve collections from the BIR and Bureau of Customs through better and more honest administration.
No one can disagree with the need for collection efficiency and honesty. However, people with first-hand experience with reform efforts in these bureaus will say that while such reforms are an essential component of a credible fiscal program and should thus be pursued with resolute political will - this will take time to yield results.
(Nor can the new government rely on privatization receipts - the bottom has been scraped with the disposal of the remaining 40% government stake in Petron.)
It does not help that the new government will inherit a practically bankrupt government, as newly resigned economic planning secretary Ralph Recto was quoted to have said last month. As a senator, he was principal author of the VAT law that is helping shore up the country's finances. In that interview, he expressed worry over the spending authorized by Congress that is contributing to future spending demands that are unmatched by corresponding revenues, i.e., the large increase in salaries and military pension over the next few years. Add to that the structural erosion in revenues that is embedded in some tax laws both passed and forthcoming (a number with doubtful economic and social justification) and the expected still weak recovery from recession keeping tax collections down. While a fiscal crisis was averted with the expanded VAT law in 2005, we are back on a worsening trajectory on all fiscal indicators, be it tax to GDP, deficit to GDP, or public debt to GDP.
Thus, absent any change in the tax structure and base, administrative reform cannot possibly generate the needed increased revenues. Nor would such a weak and incomplete fiscal program that depended on incremental improvements from administrative measures achieve the credibility demanded by the domestic markets and the international financial community to finance required infrastructure and social spending over the next six years.
We will need front-loading of strong, believable fiscal action- otherwise, it will be a case of too little too late and no money, no honey.
What are the measures that can help generate such levels of money and credibility?
The package advocated by UP economists/professor friends who have also served in senior posts in government (Dante Canlas, Ben Diokno, Philip Medalla ) included: a) reform fiscal incentives; b) reform excise taxes on cigarettes and liquor; c) increase the VAT to 15% while lowering the personal and corporate income taxes to 25%; d) adopt higher/variable tax rates on fuel products.
Items (a) and (b) have been on the legislative agenda of the Department of Finance for over a decade, and is still in the mill in the current Congress. While I have pushed for these in the past, both as a public servant and now as an economic commentator, my wish is that nothing comes out of this Congress. Why? Given that this is now election season, the risk is that what comes out will be the exact opposite of what is needed as had happened with the Comprehensive Tax Reform Package in the 1990s. It is best that the Department of Finance technocrats muster their energies for keeping further revenue erosion bills at bay. (It would be too much to expect a presidential veto when we are prematurely in full election fever pitch.)
Certainly then, (a) and (b) need to be pushed by the next president. All the technical work has been done there. What it will take is political commitment, and political skill.
I also support the proposed increase in VAT to 15% while lowering the personal and corporate income taxes. This move can increase the net take of government from a broad and neutral tax base, while giving a break to honest taxpayers who correctly report and pay their income taxes.
Finally, we need to increase the tax take from oil products, hand in hand with full enforcement of anti-smuggling laws. This can take the form of either a complex variable tariff as advocated by friend Ben Diokno, or a simpler increase in excise tax indexed to inflation, which I prefer. Either way, this will not be easy. The next administration will need to make the public understand that: a) taxes on petroleum products are progressive, i.e., the rich pay proportionately more than the poor - more progressive than excises on tobacco and alcohol and the VAT; b) the Philippines has lower oil taxes compared to most countries at a similar income level; c) the money they are paying will help build infrastructure that will generate investment and jobs, and provide direct assistance to the disadvantaged through social services like education and health.
It will also require determination to implement the law against oil smuggling.
None of these are easy, but not impossible for a new president who has a genuine mandate, has renewed people's hopes, and has the skill to do it.
The candidates do not need to talk of these hard measures at this time. What is needed is a leader who can walk the walk at the right time. A leader able to set the vision, rally the people to bring results in ways that are possible to accomplish at the given time and openings available and working through weak institutions and contending with strong vested interests. (The Political Economy of Reform, Working Paper No. 39, World Bank Commission on Growth and Development, Bernardo and Tang, 2008
http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp039web.pdf).
Mr. Romeo Bernardo is Global Source Philippine advisor and board member of The Institute for Development and Econometric Analysis, Inc. He was formerly undersecretary of Finance during the Aquino and Ramos administrations.
Introspective
As one would expect, there have been a spate of nonpartisan exercises on a road map for the country post 2010 among institutions that have an interest in the long-term development of the country. I have been a participant/resource person in a number of them - including, the ADB, the Makati Business Club and the Ramos Peace and Development Foundation; the last one involving six presidentiables who were invited to present their platforms.
Giving the welcome remarks in the Ramos forum, I noted that while we keenly awaited the expositions of the aspirants, many of us are likely to believe that It is useless to try to hold people to anything they say when they are madly in love, drunk - or running for public office.
This was recently validated by good friend, economist guru Philip Medalla. He said that each time he and his collaborators from the UP School of Economics presented their road map with heavy emphasis on how to raise revenues to finance neglected public spending programs, none would publicly embrace the well-thought-out tax measures they propose, like increase in the VAT rate and oil taxes. The solution of the presidential hopefuls then (which do not include the current two front-runners) almost uniformly was, I will improve collections from the BIR and Bureau of Customs through better and more honest administration.
No one can disagree with the need for collection efficiency and honesty. However, people with first-hand experience with reform efforts in these bureaus will say that while such reforms are an essential component of a credible fiscal program and should thus be pursued with resolute political will - this will take time to yield results.
(Nor can the new government rely on privatization receipts - the bottom has been scraped with the disposal of the remaining 40% government stake in Petron.)
It does not help that the new government will inherit a practically bankrupt government, as newly resigned economic planning secretary Ralph Recto was quoted to have said last month. As a senator, he was principal author of the VAT law that is helping shore up the country's finances. In that interview, he expressed worry over the spending authorized by Congress that is contributing to future spending demands that are unmatched by corresponding revenues, i.e., the large increase in salaries and military pension over the next few years. Add to that the structural erosion in revenues that is embedded in some tax laws both passed and forthcoming (a number with doubtful economic and social justification) and the expected still weak recovery from recession keeping tax collections down. While a fiscal crisis was averted with the expanded VAT law in 2005, we are back on a worsening trajectory on all fiscal indicators, be it tax to GDP, deficit to GDP, or public debt to GDP.
Thus, absent any change in the tax structure and base, administrative reform cannot possibly generate the needed increased revenues. Nor would such a weak and incomplete fiscal program that depended on incremental improvements from administrative measures achieve the credibility demanded by the domestic markets and the international financial community to finance required infrastructure and social spending over the next six years.
We will need front-loading of strong, believable fiscal action- otherwise, it will be a case of too little too late and no money, no honey.
What are the measures that can help generate such levels of money and credibility?
The package advocated by UP economists/professor friends who have also served in senior posts in government (Dante Canlas, Ben Diokno, Philip Medalla ) included: a) reform fiscal incentives; b) reform excise taxes on cigarettes and liquor; c) increase the VAT to 15% while lowering the personal and corporate income taxes to 25%; d) adopt higher/variable tax rates on fuel products.
Items (a) and (b) have been on the legislative agenda of the Department of Finance for over a decade, and is still in the mill in the current Congress. While I have pushed for these in the past, both as a public servant and now as an economic commentator, my wish is that nothing comes out of this Congress. Why? Given that this is now election season, the risk is that what comes out will be the exact opposite of what is needed as had happened with the Comprehensive Tax Reform Package in the 1990s. It is best that the Department of Finance technocrats muster their energies for keeping further revenue erosion bills at bay. (It would be too much to expect a presidential veto when we are prematurely in full election fever pitch.)
Certainly then, (a) and (b) need to be pushed by the next president. All the technical work has been done there. What it will take is political commitment, and political skill.
I also support the proposed increase in VAT to 15% while lowering the personal and corporate income taxes. This move can increase the net take of government from a broad and neutral tax base, while giving a break to honest taxpayers who correctly report and pay their income taxes.
Finally, we need to increase the tax take from oil products, hand in hand with full enforcement of anti-smuggling laws. This can take the form of either a complex variable tariff as advocated by friend Ben Diokno, or a simpler increase in excise tax indexed to inflation, which I prefer. Either way, this will not be easy. The next administration will need to make the public understand that: a) taxes on petroleum products are progressive, i.e., the rich pay proportionately more than the poor - more progressive than excises on tobacco and alcohol and the VAT; b) the Philippines has lower oil taxes compared to most countries at a similar income level; c) the money they are paying will help build infrastructure that will generate investment and jobs, and provide direct assistance to the disadvantaged through social services like education and health.
It will also require determination to implement the law against oil smuggling.
None of these are easy, but not impossible for a new president who has a genuine mandate, has renewed people's hopes, and has the skill to do it.
The candidates do not need to talk of these hard measures at this time. What is needed is a leader who can walk the walk at the right time. A leader able to set the vision, rally the people to bring results in ways that are possible to accomplish at the given time and openings available and working through weak institutions and contending with strong vested interests. (The Political Economy of Reform, Working Paper No. 39, World Bank Commission on Growth and Development, Bernardo and Tang, 2008
http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp039web.pdf).
Mr. Romeo Bernardo is Global Source Philippine advisor and board member of The Institute for Development and Econometric Analysis, Inc. He was formerly undersecretary of Finance during the Aquino and Ramos administrations.
Saturday, September 5, 2009
Life is strange. Riding reflections upon turning 55
Life is strange.
Its been 5 years since, and have travelled with many of you guys all over the country from the Mt Province to Mindanao- plus Borneo (although Amina will say that's really part of the country, or at least the Sulu Sultanate). Its been a great ride, and grateful for your company, not just at the ride, but as Doc Francis said in his birthday greeting sms-- " in this highway called Life". Gracias, los Hombres.
(Incidentally, for those wondering how the name of our egroup "hombres" came to be, this is thanks to Philip who put up our egroup/riders group 3 years ago almost to the day (Sept 19, 2006). He had in mind my sms calls to ride to our group of friends, sometimes addressing everyone "hombres" .... in the style of the cowboy movies ).
Special thanks to our special guests, Jaime, Fernando, Pedro, and Do, for the honor of your presence. It was through the kindness of Pedro that Ibba and I got to own our first BMW, by practically giving it away. Of course, it is thanks to Jaime, Fernando and Do that I was able to afford the subsequent up-grades at market prices!! :^) . Salamat po.
Amina and my non-rider children- Mini and Peppy- joined us today- thank you waking up at an infernal time. We used to ride a lot as a family when I still had the energy to pedal two wheels-- and when there were bike lanes--i.e. in the Washington DC area for ten years.
I thank Amina for caring much to understand this particular mania--and recognizing it as good therapy-- despite my consistent refusal to get extra life insurance as many of you had. (In my case, my refusal was a question of survival. I did not think I ought to provide her with even more incentive than I already do).
Thanks to my buddy, Philip-- my neighbor and co-bad influence. Though we started riding, he has left me far behind in terms of skill level. But then he's at least a decade younger-- or looks like it. And able to ride the rough twisties of the Cordellierias with our other early ride buddy-- my kid brother -Ibba. (Thank you to General Boy for being our first mentor).
Maraming salamat to our guru, my kuya Randy, who by putting into words the meaning and poetry of riding-- and helped us and our loved ones appreciate this "irrationality" -- making it almost understandable to them. And for being around to be poster boy for the Hombres, and making us almost respectable. This is very important for getting visas from many of our wives (though he is in the states, thanks to our 78 year old ride buddy , Brod Pete-- for being our inspiration--- and our aspiration).
And not the least, our commander-- Eric, for planning, organizing, and leading all of our expeditions- with meticulous care and detail -- our "mother hen" as Randy correctly put it-- an officer, a gentleman, a leader-- and occasionally when needed, a mechanic and videoke king. Thank you, Eric, together with our doctor rider buddies, Benjie and Paul, that I am still in one piece at age 55. And equally, thanks to your lovely lady, dermatologist Doc Michelle, who has kept me pretty at 55.
Maraming salamat po.
Monday, August 31, 2009
Thinking about banking sector risks
Business World
Introspective
The latest World Bank Philippines Quarterly Update, Sailing through stormy waters (July 2009), has some good news to tell. Tucked among pages discussing the country's expected poorer economic prospects this year is a box that begins with the conclusion that alert levels on the Philippine banking system have come down over the past six months. This is a relief for many who late last year had been bracing for more contagion from the US financial turmoil.
Transmission of turbulence from developed markets to local shores in the September/October period last year had mainly come through falling prices of dollar-denominated Philippine government securities (popularly called ROPs) that comprise an important portion of bank assets.
Notwithstanding this generally favorable conclusion, the report observes that banks continue to have a large exposure to interest rate risks with about P700 billion, representing 12% of total assets, subject to fair value accounting. For a 100-basis-point increase in spreads on all types of government securities, it is estimated that banks can potentially lose about 50 to 70% of average annual profits on account of lost value from government security holdings.
This consideration provides yet another important reason why Philippine fiscal authorities have been quite cautious in joining full steam the fiscal stimulus bandwagon. The other reasons being the more generally known effect of high interest rates (and thus debt service) in crowding out essential public social and infrastructure spending, and in discouraging private investments and job creation. (Finance officials have been emphatic on their having a medium-term fiscal program that tries to bring back the debt-to-GDP ratio to a downward trajectory by steadily bringing the deficit from 3.2% of GDP [P250 billion] this year, back to near balance by 2013.)
The World Bank Quarterly update likewise observes that concerns over market and liquidity risks have given way to worries about credit risk that follows weaker economic prospects. Bankers I've talked to tell me that they are already seeing upticks in default rates in industries that have been directly affected by the economic downturn. These include exporters and overseas workers and their families who have taken out loans to purchase homes in the Philippines. Of the two, housing loans appear to be more worrisome as this has been an important growth area in past years, having benefited from the rapid remittance growth.
Nevertheless, the continuing growth in remittances offer comfort (as well as the fact that Filipinos put great store on housing investments and can be expected to keep up mortgage payments - even dipping into savings - for as long as possible).
While the entire real estate sector is being watched closely for potential problems, a collapse similar to what happened in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian crisis can be ruled out; most real estate companies today are profitable with relatively low debt ratios.
Some of the big real estate firms, e.g., Ayala Land, Megaworld, have also started to rely less on banks for financing, instead tapping lenders directly with bond issuances. Any remaining bank financing had been done against company balance sheets rather than project cash flows, adding a layer of protection for banks. Meanwhile, a new mode of housing finance, based on developers' contracts to sell, have been done with recourse to developers, minimizing risk to banks.
Apart from real estate, another area which has shown dramatic growth in bank exposure has been the power sector. This is driven in part by real need to invest in capacity after years of under-investment in this sector, and in part by financing for the acquisition of plants being privatized by government.
By and large the lending has been to borrowers with good credit rating and good track records in operating in this industry. What is needed to make sure these chunky loans perform well is the maturing of the regulatory environment. This includes, the functioning of the Energy Regulatory Board, so that it's rate setting does not get politicized (even as we enter a political season), and tweaking the operations of the Wholesale Electricity Spot Market (WESM) to more fully reflect true electricity supply/demand conditions. (Ditto for loans to the water sector and the sometimes idiosyncratic regulatory regime governing it.)
Another somewhat related and more long-term concern is increased concentration of lending to conglomerates, something that the World Bank report also mentioned.
An example of this is San Miguel's venture into regulated industries such as oil, power, and water that require lumpy investments that need to be financed.
Although a large chunk has been borrowed from the capital markets, banks have also bought these bonds adding to their exposures to San Miguel. While the single borrower's limit mitigates against concentration risk, banks will increasingly find it hard to find other lending outlets to diversify risk.
The report further observes that risks that may eventuate in a scenario of low growth are drags on banks' earnings resulting from a more difficult operating environment that will see banks' interest rate margins squeezed, loan growth decelerating, and cost of lending rising.
This setting may also test the appropriateness of individual bank capital in terms of covering unexpected losses and/or higher risk taking. While the big banks may have no problem raising capital in the current environment of high liquidity, the smaller banks may find it more difficult - and could result in pressure for further consolidation of the banking system, arguably a good thing.
Mr. Romeo Bernardo is Global Source Philippine advisor and board member of The Institute for Development and Econometric Analysis, Inc.
Introspective
The latest World Bank Philippines Quarterly Update, Sailing through stormy waters (July 2009), has some good news to tell. Tucked among pages discussing the country's expected poorer economic prospects this year is a box that begins with the conclusion that alert levels on the Philippine banking system have come down over the past six months. This is a relief for many who late last year had been bracing for more contagion from the US financial turmoil.
Transmission of turbulence from developed markets to local shores in the September/October period last year had mainly come through falling prices of dollar-denominated Philippine government securities (popularly called ROPs) that comprise an important portion of bank assets.
Notwithstanding this generally favorable conclusion, the report observes that banks continue to have a large exposure to interest rate risks with about P700 billion, representing 12% of total assets, subject to fair value accounting. For a 100-basis-point increase in spreads on all types of government securities, it is estimated that banks can potentially lose about 50 to 70% of average annual profits on account of lost value from government security holdings.
This consideration provides yet another important reason why Philippine fiscal authorities have been quite cautious in joining full steam the fiscal stimulus bandwagon. The other reasons being the more generally known effect of high interest rates (and thus debt service) in crowding out essential public social and infrastructure spending, and in discouraging private investments and job creation. (Finance officials have been emphatic on their having a medium-term fiscal program that tries to bring back the debt-to-GDP ratio to a downward trajectory by steadily bringing the deficit from 3.2% of GDP [P250 billion] this year, back to near balance by 2013.)
The World Bank Quarterly update likewise observes that concerns over market and liquidity risks have given way to worries about credit risk that follows weaker economic prospects. Bankers I've talked to tell me that they are already seeing upticks in default rates in industries that have been directly affected by the economic downturn. These include exporters and overseas workers and their families who have taken out loans to purchase homes in the Philippines. Of the two, housing loans appear to be more worrisome as this has been an important growth area in past years, having benefited from the rapid remittance growth.
Nevertheless, the continuing growth in remittances offer comfort (as well as the fact that Filipinos put great store on housing investments and can be expected to keep up mortgage payments - even dipping into savings - for as long as possible).
While the entire real estate sector is being watched closely for potential problems, a collapse similar to what happened in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian crisis can be ruled out; most real estate companies today are profitable with relatively low debt ratios.
Some of the big real estate firms, e.g., Ayala Land, Megaworld, have also started to rely less on banks for financing, instead tapping lenders directly with bond issuances. Any remaining bank financing had been done against company balance sheets rather than project cash flows, adding a layer of protection for banks. Meanwhile, a new mode of housing finance, based on developers' contracts to sell, have been done with recourse to developers, minimizing risk to banks.
Apart from real estate, another area which has shown dramatic growth in bank exposure has been the power sector. This is driven in part by real need to invest in capacity after years of under-investment in this sector, and in part by financing for the acquisition of plants being privatized by government.
By and large the lending has been to borrowers with good credit rating and good track records in operating in this industry. What is needed to make sure these chunky loans perform well is the maturing of the regulatory environment. This includes, the functioning of the Energy Regulatory Board, so that it's rate setting does not get politicized (even as we enter a political season), and tweaking the operations of the Wholesale Electricity Spot Market (WESM) to more fully reflect true electricity supply/demand conditions. (Ditto for loans to the water sector and the sometimes idiosyncratic regulatory regime governing it.)
Another somewhat related and more long-term concern is increased concentration of lending to conglomerates, something that the World Bank report also mentioned.
An example of this is San Miguel's venture into regulated industries such as oil, power, and water that require lumpy investments that need to be financed.
Although a large chunk has been borrowed from the capital markets, banks have also bought these bonds adding to their exposures to San Miguel. While the single borrower's limit mitigates against concentration risk, banks will increasingly find it hard to find other lending outlets to diversify risk.
The report further observes that risks that may eventuate in a scenario of low growth are drags on banks' earnings resulting from a more difficult operating environment that will see banks' interest rate margins squeezed, loan growth decelerating, and cost of lending rising.
This setting may also test the appropriateness of individual bank capital in terms of covering unexpected losses and/or higher risk taking. While the big banks may have no problem raising capital in the current environment of high liquidity, the smaller banks may find it more difficult - and could result in pressure for further consolidation of the banking system, arguably a good thing.
Mr. Romeo Bernardo is Global Source Philippine advisor and board member of The Institute for Development and Econometric Analysis, Inc.
Thursday, July 16, 2009
Welcome Remarks, 10th FVR_RPDEV Lecture
By
Romeo L. Bernardo (for RFO Center for Public Finance and Regional Cooperation)
Good afternoon distinguished speakers and guests. Welcome to the 10th RPDEV Lecture Series.
I have been asked by my former boss and still friend, Bobby de Ocampo to deliver the welcome remarks on his behalf as a member of the Board of Advisers of the RFO Center, as he had to travel on urgent business.
Let me start by quoting something he said over a decade ago when he received the highly esteemed recognition of Euromoney Finance Minister of the Year in 1996, explaining the hard tasks of a Finance Secretary--- “ A Finance Secretary has many difficult and important decisions he has to make—the most critical by far being --- which president to serve.”
He has decided most wisely—( Pause for applause.. “palakpak naman diyan” ! ;^)
The nation is at that threshold when we need to decide whom to choose to lead us. But even before then we need to ensure first of all that we do have credible and orderly elections in 2010 that will allow us to renew our faith in democracy and to chose our leaders.
At this time of unprecedented global financial and economic challenge and domestic divisiveness and failures in governance, perhaps at no time in our history do we need visionary and effective leadership as do we do today. Such kind of leadership was defined in a paper documenting the Political Economy of Reform during the Ramos Administration ( Growth Commission, World Bank, 2008) as one, like PFVR’s, able “to set the vision, rally the people to bring results in ways that are possible to accomplish at the time given and openings available and working through weak institutions and contending with strong vested interests.
This is the third time RPDEV and the RFO Center are working together to ensure that our common advocacy of an informed public sector is realized. Past Lectures have tackled issues concerning our development post 1997 Asian financial crisis and global financial situation relative to the current crisis. .
Today we have brought together 6 people whom you perceive as potential leaders of our country. We will listen to what they have to say on socio-economic development and prospects for peace. Our speakers have consistently been mentioned as possible “presidentiables” in the forthcoming 2010 elections.
(We look forward to listening to and interacting with them, even though some may believe that it is useless to try to hold people to anything they say when they are madly in love, drunk or running for office. )
Now with all seriousness, allow me to formally welcome all of you to the 10th FVR-RPDEV Lecture.
I turn you over to our Moderator, Atty Mike Toledo, Country President of Webershandwick Worldwide, our co-sponsor-- to begin the Presentation Proper.
Tuesday, July 14, 2009
Slow drag
Business World
Introspective
We do not foresee a recession in the Philippines in the technical sense, but the economy will in all likelihood grow at a snail's pace. Though the sharp slowdown of economic activity in the first quarter has set the pace for the entire year, we don't expect conditions rapidly deteriorating from that point forward. Remittances have so far managed to hold steady, which means any decline, if it happens, will be minimal, while export and import numbers have been observed to slowly even out, improving the balance.
The effects of higher fiscal spending may soon start to become perceptible especially as elections near, while expectations of a global recovery should help revitalize consumers somewhat later in the year.
But an upturn in the world economy, especially a weak one, may not mean much for the Philippines. Ironically, while low export vulnerability has kept the country sheltered from the global downturn, this same feature prevents it from riding any global revival to the hilt. With major trade partners on a slow road to recovery and nothing much on the domestic front to spark domestic activity, we see the Philippine economy still performing below trend even in the subsequent year.
Growth numbers for 1Q09 were worse than expected, at 0.4% year on year or below consensus expectations of about 2%. The results have prompted multilateral agencies to slash further their gloomy forecasts. The IMF now predicts a GDP decline of about 1% from earlier expectations of flat growth, while the World Bank expects a 0.5% dip in output (from 1.9%). The consensus estimate of private analysts has likewise fallen to a mere 1.2%.
The pessimism comes from the sudden weakness in consumer spending (up by just 0.8% year on year), which had been a stable engine of growth for nearly two decades. We are wary of the reported statistics for several reasons: (1) remittances during the period slowed but did not decline while the peso correspondingly depreciated; (2) purchasing power had actually risen due to softer prices of oil and commodities; (3) minimum wage tax exemptions should have worked to increase personal incomes; and (4) employment numbers did not deteriorate radically based on government statistics.
The sharp slowdown in consumer spending, initially measured with the help of production data, is likely traced in part to what appeared to be a plunge in tobacco consumption as manufacturers front-loaded sales to marketing arms to escape a scheduled increase in excise taxes this year. Moreover, value-added taxes rose 14% annually in 1Q09 (10% in the first four months), indicating that the domestic economy may not have been as anemic as the national income accounts estimates suggest. Hence, we will not be surprised to see some correction upward in future periods.
Going forward, we continue to see growth of 0.5%-1% with downside risks. Remittances may slow further and possibly still decline (by as much as 3% in our latest estimate) as world unemployment trails the global recession. Capital formation will likely still suffer as firms cut down inventory and defer large-scale investment under an uncertain business environment. The spread of swine flu - the Philippines already has the highest count in Southeast Asia and the seventh highest in the world - may be another dampener to economic activity, particularly for tourism-related sectors and businesses dependent on people coming out and converging such as in malls, hotels, and restaurants.
However, exports may have already bottomed and we can realistically expect external trade to even out further and the decline in manufacturing to slow. Services exports, especially of the business process outsourcing (BPO) sector, will remain strong according to industry insiders we have talked to, likely growing at double-digit rates. Government spending delayed by the late signing of the national budget and allegedly held back for reasons of political strategy may begin to reflect in the national accounts beginning 2Q09. We also hope to see some clarity in the political scene after the President's state-of-the-nation address later this month (July 27, 2009). This should serve as the strongest signal for unleashing election-related spending which can help push up domestic demand.
The latest consumer expectations survey by the central bank was still downbeat, but with possible "green shoots" in the world economy those holding out for bad days may eventually start loosening purse strings. It is interesting to note that business expectations had started to turn around in the last survey, particularly in construction and services and we can expect a sense of normalcy returning to the business sector. Real estate companies, for instance, have noticed a marked improvement in sales beginning 2Q09 even in the high-end property sector.
While fiscal and monetary policies remain supportive, we will probably not see more aggressive measures to prop up growth. The most recent widening of the fiscal deficit target (from P199.2 billion to P250 billion) basically involved a P56.6-billion reduction in expected revenues and a P5.8-billion cutback in planned spending. Finance officials seem deeply concerned these days about the impact of large deficits on fiscal sustainability as opposed to intensifying the fiscal stimulus to spur growth.
Monetary policy could remain expansionary for the meantime though supply side risks to inflation may eventually constrain monetary authorities, especially with world oil prices rising along with some recovery in global demand. There is also an acknowledged limit to what monetary policy can achieve in spurring bank lending given current appetites for investment and consumption combined with banks' precautionary tightening of loan standards.
The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas notes how policy cuts have only partially translated to a decline in lending rates - only about 40% of the 175 bps decline in the overnight RRP rate since December has translated to a fall in bank lending rates.
We may not see unemployment rising above 8% on average this year as anticipated by many analysts, as the latest numbers even improved on quarter-ago and year-ago figures (7.5% recorded last April compared with 7.7% last January and 8% a year ago). While this can be interpreted as another sign that a recession may not be afoot, the picture is mixed. Employment numbers rose for unpaid family workers and the self-employed who do not employ other workers, while jobs for wage and salary workers in private establishments hardly grew. The former classes of workers are negatively correlated with GDP growth while the latter are positively correlated with growth.
Meanwhile, even if global economic recovery is expected by the end of the year, the Philippines may not capitalize much from this. Low export exposure has shielded the country from the global downturn, but also prevents it from maximizing the benefits of a revival. Coupled with likely weak recovery in advanced economies, we see only 3.0%-3.5% growth next year, which is still below trend.
The risks to our forecasts include the following: * Prolonged global downturn. Things are starting to look up though as global projections have lately improved. The IMF in its latest World Economic Update now sees forces pulling the world economy down decreasing in intensity, but also says the forthcoming recovery will likely be weak. * Larger-than-expected remittance drop. The likely shock to our forecast now seems to be on the upside, with remittances still up by 2.6% in the first four months of the year and deployment reportedly growing. Forecasts of economists from the World Bank and the IMF range between -4% to -7%, which is similar to the average for private analysts. Their poor prognosis for remittance inflows partly underpins their expectations of a Philippine recession (between -0.5% and -1% GDP decline). * Oil market volatility. This remains a serious risk that could derail recovery in the local economy. A continued uptick in oil prices may be the inevitable consequence however as forward-looking oil markets detect a global recovery. Crude oil prices (Dubai fateh) have risen over 70% since the start of the year, when prices bottomed. * Fiscal slippage. This can be a serious concern for the country given both structural and cyclical drags to revenue collection. This is one area that needs to be constantly monitored especially given its impact on financial markets. * Political turmoil. There continue to be rumblings about the push for a charter change (cha-cha) initiative by administration allies, possibility of failure of elections, and of the President possibly running for a congressional seat in her home province with the end goal of becoming prime minister. This is happening in an environment of isolated bombings in the South and pyrotechnic bombings in Metro Manila by unidentified parties with unclear objectives, thus raising the much-feared scenario of martial law and emergency rule.
Excerpt from Global Source quarterly report on the Philippines - "Snail's Pace" by Mr. Romeo Bernardo and Ms. Margarita Gonzales. Mr. Bernardo is a board member of The Institute for Development and Econometric Analysis, Inc.
Introspective
We do not foresee a recession in the Philippines in the technical sense, but the economy will in all likelihood grow at a snail's pace. Though the sharp slowdown of economic activity in the first quarter has set the pace for the entire year, we don't expect conditions rapidly deteriorating from that point forward. Remittances have so far managed to hold steady, which means any decline, if it happens, will be minimal, while export and import numbers have been observed to slowly even out, improving the balance.
The effects of higher fiscal spending may soon start to become perceptible especially as elections near, while expectations of a global recovery should help revitalize consumers somewhat later in the year.
But an upturn in the world economy, especially a weak one, may not mean much for the Philippines. Ironically, while low export vulnerability has kept the country sheltered from the global downturn, this same feature prevents it from riding any global revival to the hilt. With major trade partners on a slow road to recovery and nothing much on the domestic front to spark domestic activity, we see the Philippine economy still performing below trend even in the subsequent year.
Growth numbers for 1Q09 were worse than expected, at 0.4% year on year or below consensus expectations of about 2%. The results have prompted multilateral agencies to slash further their gloomy forecasts. The IMF now predicts a GDP decline of about 1% from earlier expectations of flat growth, while the World Bank expects a 0.5% dip in output (from 1.9%). The consensus estimate of private analysts has likewise fallen to a mere 1.2%.
The pessimism comes from the sudden weakness in consumer spending (up by just 0.8% year on year), which had been a stable engine of growth for nearly two decades. We are wary of the reported statistics for several reasons: (1) remittances during the period slowed but did not decline while the peso correspondingly depreciated; (2) purchasing power had actually risen due to softer prices of oil and commodities; (3) minimum wage tax exemptions should have worked to increase personal incomes; and (4) employment numbers did not deteriorate radically based on government statistics.
The sharp slowdown in consumer spending, initially measured with the help of production data, is likely traced in part to what appeared to be a plunge in tobacco consumption as manufacturers front-loaded sales to marketing arms to escape a scheduled increase in excise taxes this year. Moreover, value-added taxes rose 14% annually in 1Q09 (10% in the first four months), indicating that the domestic economy may not have been as anemic as the national income accounts estimates suggest. Hence, we will not be surprised to see some correction upward in future periods.
Going forward, we continue to see growth of 0.5%-1% with downside risks. Remittances may slow further and possibly still decline (by as much as 3% in our latest estimate) as world unemployment trails the global recession. Capital formation will likely still suffer as firms cut down inventory and defer large-scale investment under an uncertain business environment. The spread of swine flu - the Philippines already has the highest count in Southeast Asia and the seventh highest in the world - may be another dampener to economic activity, particularly for tourism-related sectors and businesses dependent on people coming out and converging such as in malls, hotels, and restaurants.
However, exports may have already bottomed and we can realistically expect external trade to even out further and the decline in manufacturing to slow. Services exports, especially of the business process outsourcing (BPO) sector, will remain strong according to industry insiders we have talked to, likely growing at double-digit rates. Government spending delayed by the late signing of the national budget and allegedly held back for reasons of political strategy may begin to reflect in the national accounts beginning 2Q09. We also hope to see some clarity in the political scene after the President's state-of-the-nation address later this month (July 27, 2009). This should serve as the strongest signal for unleashing election-related spending which can help push up domestic demand.
The latest consumer expectations survey by the central bank was still downbeat, but with possible "green shoots" in the world economy those holding out for bad days may eventually start loosening purse strings. It is interesting to note that business expectations had started to turn around in the last survey, particularly in construction and services and we can expect a sense of normalcy returning to the business sector. Real estate companies, for instance, have noticed a marked improvement in sales beginning 2Q09 even in the high-end property sector.
While fiscal and monetary policies remain supportive, we will probably not see more aggressive measures to prop up growth. The most recent widening of the fiscal deficit target (from P199.2 billion to P250 billion) basically involved a P56.6-billion reduction in expected revenues and a P5.8-billion cutback in planned spending. Finance officials seem deeply concerned these days about the impact of large deficits on fiscal sustainability as opposed to intensifying the fiscal stimulus to spur growth.
Monetary policy could remain expansionary for the meantime though supply side risks to inflation may eventually constrain monetary authorities, especially with world oil prices rising along with some recovery in global demand. There is also an acknowledged limit to what monetary policy can achieve in spurring bank lending given current appetites for investment and consumption combined with banks' precautionary tightening of loan standards.
The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas notes how policy cuts have only partially translated to a decline in lending rates - only about 40% of the 175 bps decline in the overnight RRP rate since December has translated to a fall in bank lending rates.
We may not see unemployment rising above 8% on average this year as anticipated by many analysts, as the latest numbers even improved on quarter-ago and year-ago figures (7.5% recorded last April compared with 7.7% last January and 8% a year ago). While this can be interpreted as another sign that a recession may not be afoot, the picture is mixed. Employment numbers rose for unpaid family workers and the self-employed who do not employ other workers, while jobs for wage and salary workers in private establishments hardly grew. The former classes of workers are negatively correlated with GDP growth while the latter are positively correlated with growth.
Meanwhile, even if global economic recovery is expected by the end of the year, the Philippines may not capitalize much from this. Low export exposure has shielded the country from the global downturn, but also prevents it from maximizing the benefits of a revival. Coupled with likely weak recovery in advanced economies, we see only 3.0%-3.5% growth next year, which is still below trend.
The risks to our forecasts include the following: * Prolonged global downturn. Things are starting to look up though as global projections have lately improved. The IMF in its latest World Economic Update now sees forces pulling the world economy down decreasing in intensity, but also says the forthcoming recovery will likely be weak. * Larger-than-expected remittance drop. The likely shock to our forecast now seems to be on the upside, with remittances still up by 2.6% in the first four months of the year and deployment reportedly growing. Forecasts of economists from the World Bank and the IMF range between -4% to -7%, which is similar to the average for private analysts. Their poor prognosis for remittance inflows partly underpins their expectations of a Philippine recession (between -0.5% and -1% GDP decline). * Oil market volatility. This remains a serious risk that could derail recovery in the local economy. A continued uptick in oil prices may be the inevitable consequence however as forward-looking oil markets detect a global recovery. Crude oil prices (Dubai fateh) have risen over 70% since the start of the year, when prices bottomed. * Fiscal slippage. This can be a serious concern for the country given both structural and cyclical drags to revenue collection. This is one area that needs to be constantly monitored especially given its impact on financial markets. * Political turmoil. There continue to be rumblings about the push for a charter change (cha-cha) initiative by administration allies, possibility of failure of elections, and of the President possibly running for a congressional seat in her home province with the end goal of becoming prime minister. This is happening in an environment of isolated bombings in the South and pyrotechnic bombings in Metro Manila by unidentified parties with unclear objectives, thus raising the much-feared scenario of martial law and emergency rule.
Excerpt from Global Source quarterly report on the Philippines - "Snail's Pace" by Mr. Romeo Bernardo and Ms. Margarita Gonzales. Mr. Bernardo is a board member of The Institute for Development and Econometric Analysis, Inc.
Monday, June 8, 2009
Turning back clock on fiscal reform
Business World
Reforms undertaken in recent years in the fiscal, monetary and financial sphere contributed importantly to the resiliency of the Philippine financial sector, keeping it relatively insulated from the global financial tsunami. In the fiscal area, the reform pillars were the adjustments in the VAT system and in power tariffs. These were instrumental in reversing the deficit in the consolidated public sector from 5.5% of GDP in 2002 to a surplus of 0.5% by 2007 and in bringing down the non financial public sector debt from over 100% of GDP in 2003 to only 61% by 2007.
These in turn helped to enhance confidence and stability of financial markets that contributed to reduced risk premium, greater willingness to hold Philippine credit, and lower interest rates.
Improved fiscal headroom has placed the Philippine government in a position to consider using some spending to cushion the economy from the synchronized recession happening externally. The operational word, as a World Bank friend observed, considering the still high debt ratio relative to peers and vulnerability to financial market sentiment is "controlled fiscal stimulus."
I would consider "control" to mean not just avoiding overspending, but also spending as planned. This is a matter that the BSP brass, concerned over the burden on monetary policy, has recently commented on, remarking at the disappointing first-quarter growth outcomes that could have been cushioned by government spending planned under the widely heralded economic resiliency plan.
Most importantly, control means having an eye on long-term fiscal sustainability despite a short- term spike in the deficit needed to prevent a recession. Even the monopoly printer of the world's money realizes this. Fed Chair Ben Bernanke, in a testimony to Congress, said: "Unless we demonstrate a strong commitment to fiscal sustainability in the longer run, we will have neither financial stability nor healthy economic growth."
While a fall in revenues as a result of lower growth is something financial markets understand, indeed is part of what economists call "automatic fiscal stabilizers," there have been structural erosion and administrative lapses gnawing away at fiscal sustainability that needs to be addressed. These include: the inflation eroding the value of non-indexed sin taxes, the exemption of minimum wage earners from income taxes, lower corporate income tax, new exemptions legislated for tourism, etc. Likewise, continuing slippages in tax administration, notably VAT and tariffs on imports particularly oil, is a cause of concern, the latter especially so with the approach of June 2010. The under-declaration of imports of about 2% of GDP due to "election-related lenience" (the terms used by the IMF in its report, "Philippines: 2007 Article IV Consultation- Staff Report") could have cost P20 billion in lost collections in 2007. In addition, the tax effort (tax-to-GDP ratio), has already fallen to 14.1% last year from 14.3% in 2006, which are low versus the best level achieved during the Ramos period of 17% in 1997, when the Philippine credit rating was at least two notches higher than it is now. The tax effort even fell further to 11.5% of GDP in the first quarter (not considering seasonality).
In light of this, the public needs to support the vigorous efforts of the Department of Finance (DoF) to push forward with its agenda for long-term fiscal sustainability, especially in an environment where there are pressures to turn back the fiscal reform clock.
The architecture that underpinned much of the reforms over the years is a buoyant system that casts a wide net and is neutral across sectors. It was considered that an expanded VAT, covering heretofore earlier exempted sectors like professional services, power, and fuel while exempting purchases of the poor (like agricultural products in their raw state), best achieved this objective. This VAT pillar is supposed to sit side by side with: a) a flat low rate and non-distorting tariff system, b) an income tax system that is equitable and simple and depends on withholding mechanisms where feasible and c) a robust excise tax system on goods whose social costs are not reflected in their commercial cost, i.e., liquor, tobacco, and oil.
How do some of the initiatives stack up against this model? One initiative gaining ground is to revert to a system of taxation of distribution utilities in power to a franchise tax instead of a VAT. This is the second attempt to dilute the structural reform under RA 9337 (RVAT). When the legislative franchise was approved for Transco, the law reverted the taxation to franchise tax in lieu of all taxes. Apart from making government lose an estimated P7.1 billion in VAT and income taxes annually, this new bill will create holes in the self-policing nature of a widely cast VAT net where one person's tax payment is another one's tax credit. Finally, electric power is an item of consumption that is elastic with income (the DoF says that 93% of power is consumed by the high- and middle-income groups). If the intent is to help the poor, it is better to do it by way of expenditures for education and health as well as the newly adopted conditional cash transfer program.
Also actively under discussion are DoF initiatives to prevent further erosion of the value of collection from "sin taxes"- alcohol and tobacco - and to increase the take from these. The Philippines has one of the lowest levels in Asia of taxation of these two products as well as of oil. Consumption of all three products is imbued with what economists call "negative externalities," i.e., the broader public carries the costs for the consumption of the good in the form of pollution, public health care costs, driving accidents, crime, etc. not reflected in the price of the good. Thus, there are special taxes on such goods/activities (on top of what is already collected in the form of VAT and income taxes) to discourage consumption and to provide government resources needed to address their ill effects. Given the influence of the industry players that will be affected by this renewed initiative of the DoF to yet again align our collection from these to international standards, it will sadly likely fail to pass again for the nth time of trying in decades. That is, unless the political leadership is prepared to spend political capital for it. (Something that is perhaps being saved for more ambitious objectives than fiscal sustainability at this time).
Finally, there is the tax on text - a fiscal measure that surfaces every now and then as a quick fix, even when it does not fit the architecture. The proposals in its various forms have technical flaws and they have legal flaws, all of which have been ventilated in Congress' halls. In my view, though, the basic flaw is philosophical, i.e., why are texting and other products/services of telecommunication companies being treated like sin products in approaching it for taxation? Why is it being singled out for imposition of a special levy or burden? Does it give rise to costs to the public which the individual consumer is not bearing?
This is the opposite of the reality. Improving communication among people is something that creates "positive externalities." It creates welfare-enhancing benefits to larger society, including allowing OFWs to strengthen bonds with their family and the national community. It is key to the development of new businesses that help keep joblessness at bay and the economy afloat - from the BPOs that contribute 4% of GDP to the hundreds of thousands of sellers of text load. It improves efficiency in communications for production activities from the largest conglomerates to the smallest micro-entrepreneur or farmer trying to find out the price of produce in the market.
In its present reincarnation the tax on text comes in the form of a 20% tax on gross SMS receipts (the current Senate version) and a more complicated version (via House resolution) where the NTC implements a P0.05 per text tax in the form of a kind of fee. Considering that the current cost of texting via promos is only P0.10 to P0.30 per text, such a tax is no different from excise tax ranging from 20 % to as high as 50% - on a product that is not a sin, but is indeed a blessing.
(Disclosure: The author is a director of Globe Telecom, and more importantly is an inveterate texter.)
Reforms undertaken in recent years in the fiscal, monetary and financial sphere contributed importantly to the resiliency of the Philippine financial sector, keeping it relatively insulated from the global financial tsunami. In the fiscal area, the reform pillars were the adjustments in the VAT system and in power tariffs. These were instrumental in reversing the deficit in the consolidated public sector from 5.5% of GDP in 2002 to a surplus of 0.5% by 2007 and in bringing down the non financial public sector debt from over 100% of GDP in 2003 to only 61% by 2007.
These in turn helped to enhance confidence and stability of financial markets that contributed to reduced risk premium, greater willingness to hold Philippine credit, and lower interest rates.
Improved fiscal headroom has placed the Philippine government in a position to consider using some spending to cushion the economy from the synchronized recession happening externally. The operational word, as a World Bank friend observed, considering the still high debt ratio relative to peers and vulnerability to financial market sentiment is "controlled fiscal stimulus."
I would consider "control" to mean not just avoiding overspending, but also spending as planned. This is a matter that the BSP brass, concerned over the burden on monetary policy, has recently commented on, remarking at the disappointing first-quarter growth outcomes that could have been cushioned by government spending planned under the widely heralded economic resiliency plan.
Most importantly, control means having an eye on long-term fiscal sustainability despite a short- term spike in the deficit needed to prevent a recession. Even the monopoly printer of the world's money realizes this. Fed Chair Ben Bernanke, in a testimony to Congress, said: "Unless we demonstrate a strong commitment to fiscal sustainability in the longer run, we will have neither financial stability nor healthy economic growth."
While a fall in revenues as a result of lower growth is something financial markets understand, indeed is part of what economists call "automatic fiscal stabilizers," there have been structural erosion and administrative lapses gnawing away at fiscal sustainability that needs to be addressed. These include: the inflation eroding the value of non-indexed sin taxes, the exemption of minimum wage earners from income taxes, lower corporate income tax, new exemptions legislated for tourism, etc. Likewise, continuing slippages in tax administration, notably VAT and tariffs on imports particularly oil, is a cause of concern, the latter especially so with the approach of June 2010. The under-declaration of imports of about 2% of GDP due to "election-related lenience" (the terms used by the IMF in its report, "Philippines: 2007 Article IV Consultation- Staff Report") could have cost P20 billion in lost collections in 2007. In addition, the tax effort (tax-to-GDP ratio), has already fallen to 14.1% last year from 14.3% in 2006, which are low versus the best level achieved during the Ramos period of 17% in 1997, when the Philippine credit rating was at least two notches higher than it is now. The tax effort even fell further to 11.5% of GDP in the first quarter (not considering seasonality).
In light of this, the public needs to support the vigorous efforts of the Department of Finance (DoF) to push forward with its agenda for long-term fiscal sustainability, especially in an environment where there are pressures to turn back the fiscal reform clock.
The architecture that underpinned much of the reforms over the years is a buoyant system that casts a wide net and is neutral across sectors. It was considered that an expanded VAT, covering heretofore earlier exempted sectors like professional services, power, and fuel while exempting purchases of the poor (like agricultural products in their raw state), best achieved this objective. This VAT pillar is supposed to sit side by side with: a) a flat low rate and non-distorting tariff system, b) an income tax system that is equitable and simple and depends on withholding mechanisms where feasible and c) a robust excise tax system on goods whose social costs are not reflected in their commercial cost, i.e., liquor, tobacco, and oil.
How do some of the initiatives stack up against this model? One initiative gaining ground is to revert to a system of taxation of distribution utilities in power to a franchise tax instead of a VAT. This is the second attempt to dilute the structural reform under RA 9337 (RVAT). When the legislative franchise was approved for Transco, the law reverted the taxation to franchise tax in lieu of all taxes. Apart from making government lose an estimated P7.1 billion in VAT and income taxes annually, this new bill will create holes in the self-policing nature of a widely cast VAT net where one person's tax payment is another one's tax credit. Finally, electric power is an item of consumption that is elastic with income (the DoF says that 93% of power is consumed by the high- and middle-income groups). If the intent is to help the poor, it is better to do it by way of expenditures for education and health as well as the newly adopted conditional cash transfer program.
Also actively under discussion are DoF initiatives to prevent further erosion of the value of collection from "sin taxes"- alcohol and tobacco - and to increase the take from these. The Philippines has one of the lowest levels in Asia of taxation of these two products as well as of oil. Consumption of all three products is imbued with what economists call "negative externalities," i.e., the broader public carries the costs for the consumption of the good in the form of pollution, public health care costs, driving accidents, crime, etc. not reflected in the price of the good. Thus, there are special taxes on such goods/activities (on top of what is already collected in the form of VAT and income taxes) to discourage consumption and to provide government resources needed to address their ill effects. Given the influence of the industry players that will be affected by this renewed initiative of the DoF to yet again align our collection from these to international standards, it will sadly likely fail to pass again for the nth time of trying in decades. That is, unless the political leadership is prepared to spend political capital for it. (Something that is perhaps being saved for more ambitious objectives than fiscal sustainability at this time).
Finally, there is the tax on text - a fiscal measure that surfaces every now and then as a quick fix, even when it does not fit the architecture. The proposals in its various forms have technical flaws and they have legal flaws, all of which have been ventilated in Congress' halls. In my view, though, the basic flaw is philosophical, i.e., why are texting and other products/services of telecommunication companies being treated like sin products in approaching it for taxation? Why is it being singled out for imposition of a special levy or burden? Does it give rise to costs to the public which the individual consumer is not bearing?
This is the opposite of the reality. Improving communication among people is something that creates "positive externalities." It creates welfare-enhancing benefits to larger society, including allowing OFWs to strengthen bonds with their family and the national community. It is key to the development of new businesses that help keep joblessness at bay and the economy afloat - from the BPOs that contribute 4% of GDP to the hundreds of thousands of sellers of text load. It improves efficiency in communications for production activities from the largest conglomerates to the smallest micro-entrepreneur or farmer trying to find out the price of produce in the market.
In its present reincarnation the tax on text comes in the form of a 20% tax on gross SMS receipts (the current Senate version) and a more complicated version (via House resolution) where the NTC implements a P0.05 per text tax in the form of a kind of fee. Considering that the current cost of texting via promos is only P0.10 to P0.30 per text, such a tax is no different from excise tax ranging from 20 % to as high as 50% - on a product that is not a sin, but is indeed a blessing.
(Disclosure: The author is a director of Globe Telecom, and more importantly is an inveterate texter.)
Monday, April 27, 2009
Let's get fiscal, a second look
Business World
Fiscal results for the first quarter look a bit disturbing, with the budget deficit more than doubling in size from a year ago and already about three-fifths of the new full-year target of P199 billion (2.5% of GDP, from 0.5% originally before being raised to 1.2% then 2.2% previously). Part of this traces to a significant acceleration of public spending under the fiscal stimulus plan (e.g., infrastructure and operational outlays up by over 60% even under a reenacted budget), but part can also be attributed to a sudden decline in revenues.
Arguably, collection agencies will continue to meet difficulties in improving their performance with the economic cycle currently not working in their favor - e.g., slower nominal income growth and a plunge in imports bringing down taxes and duties. In addition, tax relief measures repackaged as components of the state's economic resiliency plan with an attached cost of P40 billion further weigh down revenue collection this year.
Notably, a couple of weeks ago, the Bureau of Customs asked the economic managers to further lower its target for the year of P277.2 billion, which was already adjusted from P317 billion previously set. First-quarter data show that the agency fell short of its program in the first three months by 16% or by 8.2 billion. On the other hand, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whose revenue goal was lowered to P850.6 billion from P968.3 billion originally, also failed to meet its revised target of P165.3 billion in the same period by 6.4%. Authorities, likewise, cut BIR's VATcollections target this year to P196 billion from P205 billion last year.
Taking these developments into account, it will not be surprising to see the fiscal deficit as percentage of GDP reaching the neighborhood of 3% in 2009, plus some risk of it expanding. Because of structural erosion of revenues caused by changes in the tax system, it is also likely that the tax effort ratio will decline to 13.6% or possibly, even 13.3%.
There is wide acceptance of the need for a fiscal stimulus to sustain growth, however, as even credit raters and multilateral lending institutions acknowledge the merits of such a measure. The guessing game in the market now is whether or not the 3% mark will be breached because of looser spending. Risks that indeed it will just gained steam after Secretary Recto disclosed that the possibility of incurring a fiscal deficit of about P250 billion, or approximately equivalent to the marked number, is not at all remote.
High-level fiscal managers I recently conversed with say they will certainly not want the deficit to exceed 3% of GDP, which is presumably the dreaded scenario. However, there seem to be no strong assurances that spending will be reined in to pull together even a rapidly widening fiscal gap (i.e., if revenues drastically underperform). With the May 2010 elections nearing, it would be hard to imagine such fiscal tightening down the line.
This slippery slope underscores the urgency of passing more fiscal reforms as slippage would appear to place the country on an unsustainable path. The country's debt ratio had already climbed from 55.8% to 56.3% of GDP last year (though still far below the 78.2% peak half a decade ago) and may risk rising again this year on account of lower nominal growth, likely weaker primary surpluses, and a still depreciating domestic currency. Congress is considering bills on the rationalization of fiscal incentives, simplification of net income taxes, and adjustment of excise taxes (including on oil), but nearing elections may be seriously dimming the odds of their passage into law this year.
Concerns already aired by some groups about possible lack of transparency and wastage of these injections should also be noted, especially in light of the upcoming 2010 polls. As I have always argued, the best use of a fiscal stimulus in the Philippines is actually for long-term growth through the construction of much-need infrastructure (but should be "shovel- ready" to meet the near-term goal of job generation) and well-targeted spending to alleviate the plight of the poorest families while offering them incentives to improve their human capital (e.g., through conditional cash transfers).
In contrast, we need to be careful with fiscal spending with much leakage, e.g., estimated NFA deficit which last year accounted for P72 billion (1% of GDP), or of projects that have not been sufficiently studied in terms of technical aspects, economic returns and fiscal risks being assumed, especially for new large BOT projects being recently surfaced that are unlikely to be started until way after this crisis has blown over.
Quite apart from the actual drain and wastage in resources, we need to be mindful of the signaling effect on markets, including international markets for RoPs, that are still jittery. While there is some degree of market tolerance for widened deficits with the let's-get-fiscal mantra, there is also heightened concern over specific country conditions both in the external accounts and fiscal area, as we see a growing list of countries needing to go to the IMF for emergency relief since late last year (e.g., Iceland, Poland, Hungary, Georgia, Turkey, Serbia, Ukraine, Romania, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Mexico, El Salvador, Zambia, and Kenya).
While the Philippines spreads have tightened from the highs we saw in October together with most emerging markets, holders of Philippine paper will be watching for reversal in gains in the fiscal front that can be evident from a decline in tax effort and increasing public sector debt to GDP, that is almost certain to happen this year - we all hope, within limited bounds. Sharp deterioration in these will not only affect the government's space for social and infra spending via higher debt service, but more immediately, translates to a damper on investment climate. This is especially true for the crucial banking sector, where sharp increases in the sovereign interest rates will put at risk via their holdings of government securities (on average 25% of assets), their income outlook and possibly even capital adequacy, and thus their continued ability to sustain healthy lending. "Controlled fiscal easing" (with emphasis on "controlled") as a WB friend puts it, is necessary to contain fiscal risk, especially with the prospect of slower remittance inflows in the coming months and the onset of election season later this year.
Romeo L. Bernardo is a board member of the Institute for Development and Econometric Analysis (IDEA), Inc.
Fiscal results for the first quarter look a bit disturbing, with the budget deficit more than doubling in size from a year ago and already about three-fifths of the new full-year target of P199 billion (2.5% of GDP, from 0.5% originally before being raised to 1.2% then 2.2% previously). Part of this traces to a significant acceleration of public spending under the fiscal stimulus plan (e.g., infrastructure and operational outlays up by over 60% even under a reenacted budget), but part can also be attributed to a sudden decline in revenues.
Arguably, collection agencies will continue to meet difficulties in improving their performance with the economic cycle currently not working in their favor - e.g., slower nominal income growth and a plunge in imports bringing down taxes and duties. In addition, tax relief measures repackaged as components of the state's economic resiliency plan with an attached cost of P40 billion further weigh down revenue collection this year.
Notably, a couple of weeks ago, the Bureau of Customs asked the economic managers to further lower its target for the year of P277.2 billion, which was already adjusted from P317 billion previously set. First-quarter data show that the agency fell short of its program in the first three months by 16% or by 8.2 billion. On the other hand, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whose revenue goal was lowered to P850.6 billion from P968.3 billion originally, also failed to meet its revised target of P165.3 billion in the same period by 6.4%. Authorities, likewise, cut BIR's VATcollections target this year to P196 billion from P205 billion last year.
Taking these developments into account, it will not be surprising to see the fiscal deficit as percentage of GDP reaching the neighborhood of 3% in 2009, plus some risk of it expanding. Because of structural erosion of revenues caused by changes in the tax system, it is also likely that the tax effort ratio will decline to 13.6% or possibly, even 13.3%.
There is wide acceptance of the need for a fiscal stimulus to sustain growth, however, as even credit raters and multilateral lending institutions acknowledge the merits of such a measure. The guessing game in the market now is whether or not the 3% mark will be breached because of looser spending. Risks that indeed it will just gained steam after Secretary Recto disclosed that the possibility of incurring a fiscal deficit of about P250 billion, or approximately equivalent to the marked number, is not at all remote.
High-level fiscal managers I recently conversed with say they will certainly not want the deficit to exceed 3% of GDP, which is presumably the dreaded scenario. However, there seem to be no strong assurances that spending will be reined in to pull together even a rapidly widening fiscal gap (i.e., if revenues drastically underperform). With the May 2010 elections nearing, it would be hard to imagine such fiscal tightening down the line.
This slippery slope underscores the urgency of passing more fiscal reforms as slippage would appear to place the country on an unsustainable path. The country's debt ratio had already climbed from 55.8% to 56.3% of GDP last year (though still far below the 78.2% peak half a decade ago) and may risk rising again this year on account of lower nominal growth, likely weaker primary surpluses, and a still depreciating domestic currency. Congress is considering bills on the rationalization of fiscal incentives, simplification of net income taxes, and adjustment of excise taxes (including on oil), but nearing elections may be seriously dimming the odds of their passage into law this year.
Concerns already aired by some groups about possible lack of transparency and wastage of these injections should also be noted, especially in light of the upcoming 2010 polls. As I have always argued, the best use of a fiscal stimulus in the Philippines is actually for long-term growth through the construction of much-need infrastructure (but should be "shovel- ready" to meet the near-term goal of job generation) and well-targeted spending to alleviate the plight of the poorest families while offering them incentives to improve their human capital (e.g., through conditional cash transfers).
In contrast, we need to be careful with fiscal spending with much leakage, e.g., estimated NFA deficit which last year accounted for P72 billion (1% of GDP), or of projects that have not been sufficiently studied in terms of technical aspects, economic returns and fiscal risks being assumed, especially for new large BOT projects being recently surfaced that are unlikely to be started until way after this crisis has blown over.
Quite apart from the actual drain and wastage in resources, we need to be mindful of the signaling effect on markets, including international markets for RoPs, that are still jittery. While there is some degree of market tolerance for widened deficits with the let's-get-fiscal mantra, there is also heightened concern over specific country conditions both in the external accounts and fiscal area, as we see a growing list of countries needing to go to the IMF for emergency relief since late last year (e.g., Iceland, Poland, Hungary, Georgia, Turkey, Serbia, Ukraine, Romania, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Mexico, El Salvador, Zambia, and Kenya).
While the Philippines spreads have tightened from the highs we saw in October together with most emerging markets, holders of Philippine paper will be watching for reversal in gains in the fiscal front that can be evident from a decline in tax effort and increasing public sector debt to GDP, that is almost certain to happen this year - we all hope, within limited bounds. Sharp deterioration in these will not only affect the government's space for social and infra spending via higher debt service, but more immediately, translates to a damper on investment climate. This is especially true for the crucial banking sector, where sharp increases in the sovereign interest rates will put at risk via their holdings of government securities (on average 25% of assets), their income outlook and possibly even capital adequacy, and thus their continued ability to sustain healthy lending. "Controlled fiscal easing" (with emphasis on "controlled") as a WB friend puts it, is necessary to contain fiscal risk, especially with the prospect of slower remittance inflows in the coming months and the onset of election season later this year.
Romeo L. Bernardo is a board member of the Institute for Development and Econometric Analysis (IDEA), Inc.
Monday, March 9, 2009
Externalities and economic reform
Business World
Introspective
Sometime after the midterm test, students of microeconomics are introduced to a topic called externalities, an inelegant term that simply refers to spillover effects of a particular action. First impressions of externalities are typically negative - how self-interested decisions of farmers to put as many cows as possible on public pasture grounds result in the tragedy of the overgrazed commons, overgrazing being the negative externality.
Much less prominent but equally important is the concept of positive externality, where actions can generate unintended benefits for third parties.
While externality is associated with market failure that requires government intervention to correct - taxes for negative externalities and subsidies for positive externalities - government action itself can generate positive or negative externalities, something that governments need to consciously be mindful of when making decisions to act.
The significance of positive externalities stuck with us in the course of doing work for the World Bank Growth Commission that tried to study the political economy of reform during the Ramos period (a copy of the working paper may be downloaded from http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp039web.pdf). We picked three successful reform cases - water privatization, telecommunications de-monopolization, and oil deregulation - that we thought best illustrated the process of reform, the elements that made reform succeed, and the resulting increase in sectoral competition and improvement in service delivery.
However, more than the sectoral efficiencies or macroeconomic stability gained, what we thought notable were the positive externalities generated by achieving a critical mass of reforms (starting with the resolution of the power crisis) within a short period of time. This helped to win public confidence, attract investor attention, and catalyze responses of a broader nature that expanded the economy's growth potential.
For instance, when Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew chided the Philippines in 1992 as a country where 98% of the residents are waiting for a telephone and the other two percent are waiting for a dial tone, nobody at the time realized that reforming the sector would spawn a new growth sector - business process outsourcing - for the country more than a decade later.
Similarly, the considerable positive externalities of the reform of the water sector in Manila dawned on me during a lecture of World Bank Vice President for research Danny Leipziger. His question to the audience was, "What is the single thing that explains best the quality of health in children, including infant mortality?" Answers from the audience included expenditures in public health, the number of doctors, education of mothers and their incomes, all of which were wrong. The simple answer was availability of drinking water.
Unfortunately, political instability, including what analysts consider a crisis in leadership, since the Ramos Administration has not allowed the extension of the reform to other sectors, e.g., rural water, air transport, the cement industry, agricultural commodities, ports and shipping. Pressures of the political environment have not only seen minimal follow-through in reforms but have led to government decisions that carried negative externalities in terms of their impact on long-term business investments.
An example is the non-adjustment of power rates during the Estrada administration through the Arroyo administration's first term. While this was corrected after the 2004 elections, we are now seeing something similar in the water sector with the non-implementation of agreed tariff adjustments based on the last rate rebasing exercise, a mechanism that has worked well in the past. Such actions not only expose government to the costs of potential contract disputes, but send very harmful signals that do not help reverse the decline in governance indicators since the Asian crisis.
Our case studies revealed how much leadership matters in influencing the timing of reform by clearly articulating the problems, pointing to the solutions, and rallying the people to push for change. Likewise, a maturing civil society that has a wider appreciation of the externalities generated by particular government actions seems to be more engaged now in supporting reform moves. As seen in the 2005 EVAT reform, though businesses and taxpayers realized that they would end up paying higher taxes, there was an appreciation that the reform being pushed by government would reap wide benefits to the economy and the country.
Romeo L. Bernardo is a board member of the Institute for Development and Econometric Analysis (IDEA), Inc.
Introspective
Sometime after the midterm test, students of microeconomics are introduced to a topic called externalities, an inelegant term that simply refers to spillover effects of a particular action. First impressions of externalities are typically negative - how self-interested decisions of farmers to put as many cows as possible on public pasture grounds result in the tragedy of the overgrazed commons, overgrazing being the negative externality.
Much less prominent but equally important is the concept of positive externality, where actions can generate unintended benefits for third parties.
While externality is associated with market failure that requires government intervention to correct - taxes for negative externalities and subsidies for positive externalities - government action itself can generate positive or negative externalities, something that governments need to consciously be mindful of when making decisions to act.
The significance of positive externalities stuck with us in the course of doing work for the World Bank Growth Commission that tried to study the political economy of reform during the Ramos period (a copy of the working paper may be downloaded from http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp039web.pdf). We picked three successful reform cases - water privatization, telecommunications de-monopolization, and oil deregulation - that we thought best illustrated the process of reform, the elements that made reform succeed, and the resulting increase in sectoral competition and improvement in service delivery.
However, more than the sectoral efficiencies or macroeconomic stability gained, what we thought notable were the positive externalities generated by achieving a critical mass of reforms (starting with the resolution of the power crisis) within a short period of time. This helped to win public confidence, attract investor attention, and catalyze responses of a broader nature that expanded the economy's growth potential.
For instance, when Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew chided the Philippines in 1992 as a country where 98% of the residents are waiting for a telephone and the other two percent are waiting for a dial tone, nobody at the time realized that reforming the sector would spawn a new growth sector - business process outsourcing - for the country more than a decade later.
Similarly, the considerable positive externalities of the reform of the water sector in Manila dawned on me during a lecture of World Bank Vice President for research Danny Leipziger. His question to the audience was, "What is the single thing that explains best the quality of health in children, including infant mortality?" Answers from the audience included expenditures in public health, the number of doctors, education of mothers and their incomes, all of which were wrong. The simple answer was availability of drinking water.
Unfortunately, political instability, including what analysts consider a crisis in leadership, since the Ramos Administration has not allowed the extension of the reform to other sectors, e.g., rural water, air transport, the cement industry, agricultural commodities, ports and shipping. Pressures of the political environment have not only seen minimal follow-through in reforms but have led to government decisions that carried negative externalities in terms of their impact on long-term business investments.
An example is the non-adjustment of power rates during the Estrada administration through the Arroyo administration's first term. While this was corrected after the 2004 elections, we are now seeing something similar in the water sector with the non-implementation of agreed tariff adjustments based on the last rate rebasing exercise, a mechanism that has worked well in the past. Such actions not only expose government to the costs of potential contract disputes, but send very harmful signals that do not help reverse the decline in governance indicators since the Asian crisis.
Our case studies revealed how much leadership matters in influencing the timing of reform by clearly articulating the problems, pointing to the solutions, and rallying the people to push for change. Likewise, a maturing civil society that has a wider appreciation of the externalities generated by particular government actions seems to be more engaged now in supporting reform moves. As seen in the 2005 EVAT reform, though businesses and taxpayers realized that they would end up paying higher taxes, there was an appreciation that the reform being pushed by government would reap wide benefits to the economy and the country.
Romeo L. Bernardo is a board member of the Institute for Development and Econometric Analysis (IDEA), Inc.
Monday, January 26, 2009
Let's get fiscal (Philippine style)
Business World
Introspective
With the synchronized recession everywhere, the call of the day even from such pillars of fiscal conservatism as the IMF is "fiscal stimulus." Such policy is seen as a way to counter a slowdown in global demand - which may affect exports, investments, and for countries like ours, workers' remittances - given the limitations of monetary policy in an environment of depressed consumer confidence, constrained financial markets and low interest rates (a potential "liquidity trap").
What is sometimes overlooked is the difference in country situations. As the IMF said, "While a fiscal response across many countries may be needed, not all countries have sufficient fiscal space to implement it since expansionary fiscal actions may threaten the sustainability of fiscal finances. In particular, many low income and emerging market countries, but also some advanced countries, face additional constraints such as volatile capital flows, high public and foreign indebtedness, and large risk premia."
What is appropriate for the US or China may not be appropriate for a country like the Philippines. The US, though at center of the storm, is still owner of the printing press for the world's reserve currency and has the capacity and responsibility for helping pull the world out of a potentially deep depression. The same goes for most countries in the euro zone. China has abundant international reserves as do Japan and many other East Asian countries.
Not so the Philippines. The country has only limited fiscal and debt headroom and still relies heavily on domestic and international capital markets, which continue to be bugged by risk aversion.
Debt-to-GDP ratio, while having been brought down from 78% in 2004 to only 57% last year (as of the third quarter), is still high relative to similarly rated peers and still higher than the lows achieved ten years ago. While recent borrowing by the Bureau of the Treasury had been inspired, it was still six percentage points over US Treasuries, revealing skittishness of investors for Philippine securities.
Government economic managers have been careful to characterize the fiscal stimulus package as manageable, and rightly so, as the markets have not shown adverse reaction so far. As well analyzed by Dr. Philip Medalla, the government can afford a public deficit of 2% to 3% of GDP (P150 billion to P200 billion) and keep its debt ratio on a declining trend - if it has a buoyant tax system (tax effort not declining), if it makes better use of taxpayers' money, and if macro stability and fiscal credibility can be maintained and off-budget deficits reduced.
Philip emphasizes that fiscal stresses over the past three decades have not come from the national government deficit but from surprises from contingent liabilities.
As government talks about a fiscal stimulus - or what they have labeled as the Economic Resiliency Package - to protect growth, it behooves us to remember how fiscal surprises in the past have raised the cost of credit to high levels.
What are the contingent, off-budget risks that the country's authorities should be mindful of and monitor closely (as indeed they do)?
One major category consists of borrowings of government firms guaranteed by the government. The NFA's debts come to mind, the agency being the biggest borrower lately. There are also potential risks in the National Development Corp. (NDC) and other GFIs providing seed money for a P100-billion fiscal stimulus package championed by some groups in the private sector (the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry, in particular).
Other possible sources of contingent risks include the guarantees provided to failing banks, perhaps including a syndicate of rural banks whose business model seems patterned after the Madoff scheme, and the opaque accounting of some GFIs and government corporations.
While the numbers being discussed for the stimulus package are not alarming relative to GDP (around 3%, maybe up to 4%), this will need to be appreciated in view of likely declines in tax collection and tax effort. The dip in performance will trace not only to slower economic activity and lower corporate profits, but will be partly structural in nature - i.e., due to a lowering of the corporate income tax rate from 35 to 30%, exemptions granted to minimum wage earners, and continuing non-indexation of sin taxes.
With elections nearing, Congress cannot be expected to act with much resolve on taxing matters. So, one can imagine a fiscal slow burn becoming incendiary if markets get nervous for any variety of reasons - financial contagion and capital reversal or even political turmoil occasioned by an unwelcome Latin dance.
So by all means, let's get fiscal. But let's do it in a way that is controlled and transparent. The conditional cash transfer program (e.g., grants to the poor provided their children stay in school) delivers an excellent fiscal stimulus because it is not only effective (translates immediately to consumption and GDP increase) but also has the ability to alleviate poverty. Noteworthy is the public confidence in the leadership of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) and the sponsorship and technical support of the World Bank, which already has many success stories under its belt (notably, Indonesia and Brazil). By contrast, we should beware of rushing spending on ill-prepared projects that will unlikely result in any activity, and will probably just be wasteful (think fertilizers in 2007 and the North Rail-ZTE project).
Introspective
With the synchronized recession everywhere, the call of the day even from such pillars of fiscal conservatism as the IMF is "fiscal stimulus." Such policy is seen as a way to counter a slowdown in global demand - which may affect exports, investments, and for countries like ours, workers' remittances - given the limitations of monetary policy in an environment of depressed consumer confidence, constrained financial markets and low interest rates (a potential "liquidity trap").
What is sometimes overlooked is the difference in country situations. As the IMF said, "While a fiscal response across many countries may be needed, not all countries have sufficient fiscal space to implement it since expansionary fiscal actions may threaten the sustainability of fiscal finances. In particular, many low income and emerging market countries, but also some advanced countries, face additional constraints such as volatile capital flows, high public and foreign indebtedness, and large risk premia."
What is appropriate for the US or China may not be appropriate for a country like the Philippines. The US, though at center of the storm, is still owner of the printing press for the world's reserve currency and has the capacity and responsibility for helping pull the world out of a potentially deep depression. The same goes for most countries in the euro zone. China has abundant international reserves as do Japan and many other East Asian countries.
Not so the Philippines. The country has only limited fiscal and debt headroom and still relies heavily on domestic and international capital markets, which continue to be bugged by risk aversion.
Debt-to-GDP ratio, while having been brought down from 78% in 2004 to only 57% last year (as of the third quarter), is still high relative to similarly rated peers and still higher than the lows achieved ten years ago. While recent borrowing by the Bureau of the Treasury had been inspired, it was still six percentage points over US Treasuries, revealing skittishness of investors for Philippine securities.
Government economic managers have been careful to characterize the fiscal stimulus package as manageable, and rightly so, as the markets have not shown adverse reaction so far. As well analyzed by Dr. Philip Medalla, the government can afford a public deficit of 2% to 3% of GDP (P150 billion to P200 billion) and keep its debt ratio on a declining trend - if it has a buoyant tax system (tax effort not declining), if it makes better use of taxpayers' money, and if macro stability and fiscal credibility can be maintained and off-budget deficits reduced.
Philip emphasizes that fiscal stresses over the past three decades have not come from the national government deficit but from surprises from contingent liabilities.
As government talks about a fiscal stimulus - or what they have labeled as the Economic Resiliency Package - to protect growth, it behooves us to remember how fiscal surprises in the past have raised the cost of credit to high levels.
What are the contingent, off-budget risks that the country's authorities should be mindful of and monitor closely (as indeed they do)?
One major category consists of borrowings of government firms guaranteed by the government. The NFA's debts come to mind, the agency being the biggest borrower lately. There are also potential risks in the National Development Corp. (NDC) and other GFIs providing seed money for a P100-billion fiscal stimulus package championed by some groups in the private sector (the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry, in particular).
Other possible sources of contingent risks include the guarantees provided to failing banks, perhaps including a syndicate of rural banks whose business model seems patterned after the Madoff scheme, and the opaque accounting of some GFIs and government corporations.
While the numbers being discussed for the stimulus package are not alarming relative to GDP (around 3%, maybe up to 4%), this will need to be appreciated in view of likely declines in tax collection and tax effort. The dip in performance will trace not only to slower economic activity and lower corporate profits, but will be partly structural in nature - i.e., due to a lowering of the corporate income tax rate from 35 to 30%, exemptions granted to minimum wage earners, and continuing non-indexation of sin taxes.
With elections nearing, Congress cannot be expected to act with much resolve on taxing matters. So, one can imagine a fiscal slow burn becoming incendiary if markets get nervous for any variety of reasons - financial contagion and capital reversal or even political turmoil occasioned by an unwelcome Latin dance.
So by all means, let's get fiscal. But let's do it in a way that is controlled and transparent. The conditional cash transfer program (e.g., grants to the poor provided their children stay in school) delivers an excellent fiscal stimulus because it is not only effective (translates immediately to consumption and GDP increase) but also has the ability to alleviate poverty. Noteworthy is the public confidence in the leadership of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) and the sponsorship and technical support of the World Bank, which already has many success stories under its belt (notably, Indonesia and Brazil). By contrast, we should beware of rushing spending on ill-prepared projects that will unlikely result in any activity, and will probably just be wasteful (think fertilizers in 2007 and the North Rail-ZTE project).
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